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I. INTRODUCTION
In January of 2001, Robyn and Rick Halprin became co-owners of a
home in Chicago, Illinois.1 Over the course of that winter, the Halprins en-
dured a pattern of religiously motivated harassment based on Rick's Jewish
faith. 2 According to the most recent court to consider the case, the harass-
ment they suffered was "invidiously motivated," involved the Halprins'
"neighbors' ganging up on them," and was "backed by the [local] home-
owners' association. 3 The harassment targeting the Halprins included both
vandalism to their property and an alleged cover-up of the responsible par-
ties.4 "H-town property" was scrawled in red marker on the stone wall in
front of the Halprins' home,5 and plants, trees, and holiday light displays
were damaged or destroyed on their property.6 When the Halprins began to
investigate the vandalism, they were allegedly met with harassment, intimi-
dation, and interference.7 According to the Halprins, the defendants altered
correspondence regarding an eye-witness to the vandalism; 8 attempted to
remove physical evidence in the Halprins' yard;9 threatened to force the
Halprins to sell their home;' 0 altered written minutes of the homeowners'
association board meetings to conceal wrongdoing;" and destroyed a tape
recording of one board meeting at which a defendant threatened to "make
an example" of the Halprins.12
The abuse suffered by the Halprins led them to federal court where they
filed suit alleging harassment based on religion under the federal Fair Hous-
ing Act (FHA). 13 In the course of that litigation, the district court granted a
motion to dismiss the Halprins' claims because the alleged discriminatory
and harassing actions did not occur in the context of the sale or rental of
1. Second Amended Complaint at 5, Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park
Ass'n, 208 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. I. 2002) (No. 01-C-4673).
2. Id. at 6-7.
3. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir.
2004).
4. See id. The Halprin case remains in litigation. See United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Civil Docket for Case # 1:01-CV-04673, Halprin, et al. v. Prairie Single, et al. at
https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?/259316980705-L_923_0-1 (last visited on Sept. 1, 2006).
5. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 8.
6. Id. at 7-8.
7. See id. at 8-17.
8. Id. at 10-11.
9. Id. at9.
10. Id. at 11.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 208 F. Supp. 2d 896, 899
(N.D. IIl. 2002), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 388 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 2004). The Halprins also brought
claims under applicable state law. See id.
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housing. 14 In the district court's view, the plaintiffs' allegations "fail[ed] to
implicate concerns expressed by Congress in the FHA."'
15
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit ordered that one of the Halprins' FHA
claims be reinstated.1 6 However, the court's decision was based not on the
FHA alone but also on the existence of an administrative rule promulgated
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)17 that ex-
pressly prohibits unlawful conduct interfering with persons "in their enjoy-
ment of a dwelling."' 8 Because that rule's language clearly encompassed the
defendants' alleged conduct-and, importantly, because defense counsel
never challenged the validity of the rule, which, according to the court,
"may stray too far" from the FHA to be valid' 9-the Halprins' harassment
suit survived.2°
This appellate victory may have been a Pyrrhic one, however, as the
Seventh Circuit adopted an unusually narrow interpretation of the FHA in
the course of eventually siding with the Halprins. Breaking with most courts
that have considered this issue,21  the Seventh Circuit ruled that post-
acquisition harassment is not actionable under the FHA itself, contending
that nothing in the text or legislative history of the FHA reflects "a concern
with anything but access to housing. 22 Because the Halprins did not claim
any interference with their acquisition of housing but simply that they were
harassed based on their religious beliefs after they obtained housing,23 their
allegations fell outside the protected ambit of the FHA.24 In other words, the
14. Id. at 900-03.
15. Id. at 904. When the district court dismissed the Halprins' federal FHA claims, it also dismissed
without prejudice their state law claims over which it initially exercised supplemental jurisdiction. Id. at
905-06. Subsequently, when the Seventh Circuit reinstated one of the Halprins' FHA claims, it also
reinstated their supplemental state law claims. See Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330-31.
16. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330-31.
17. Id. at 330.
18. 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(C)(2) (2006).
19. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330 (explaining that the defendants had waived an appellate challenge to
the validity of the same HUD rule); see also Walton v. Claybridge Homeowners Ass'n, No. 06-1914,
2006 WL 2243902, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 2, 2006) (same); East-Miller v. Lake County Highway Dep't,
421 F.3d 558, 562 n.I (7th Cir. 2005) (same).
20. See Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330.
21. See, e.g., United States v. City of Hayward, 36 F.3d 832, 835-36 (9th Cir. 1994); Sofarelli v.
Pinellas County, 931 F.2d 718, 722 (11th Cir. 1991); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Viii. of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288 n.5 (7th Cir. 1977); Egan v. Schmock, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1092-93
(N.D. Cal. 2000); Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238, 239-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1998);
Johnson v. Smith, 810 F. Supp. 235, 238-39 (N.D. I11. 1992); Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208,
211 (N.D. 111. 1985). See generally discussion infra Part ILI.A-C and accompanying notes. However,
according to the Seventh Circuit in Halprin, no decision recognizing a post-transaction dimension to the
FHA "contains a considered holding on the scope of the Fair Housing Act in general or its application to
a case like the present one in particular." 388 F.3d at 329.
22. See Halprin, 388 F.3d at 329.
23. Id. For the purposes of this Article, harassment that is alleged to have occurred after a sale or
rental transaction has been completed is referred to as "post-acquisition harassment," tracking language
employed by the Seventh Circuit. See Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330 (observing that "we know that § 3604 is
not addressed to post-acquisition discrimination"); see also Richards v. Bono, No. 5:04CV484-OC-
1OGRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, at *2-*5 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2005) (discussing the FHA's application to
claims of post-acquisition harassment).
24. See 388 F.3d at 329-30.
2006]
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Halprins' fair housing claims survived not because of the FHA but in spite
of it.
25
The reaction to Halprin has been swift. Defendants in subsequent hous-
ing harassment cases have begun relying on the decision to urge a narrow
reading of the FHA that would exclude claims of post-acquisition harass-
ment, and lower courts are struggling to make sense of the divergent judicial
opinions on the issue.26 At least one district court in Texas has apparently
agreed with the Seventh Circuit, concluding that the HUD rule protecting
occupancy of housing is an invalid extension of the protections afforded by
the FHA.27 Concerned reactions have also come from housing rights advo-
cates and from local lawmakers worried that the Seventh Circuit's decision
may begin to erode important federal protections for minority groups.28 The
full extent of Halprin's repercussions are unclear at this point; however, the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning, if applied in future cases, would result in a
significantly restricted ambit for the FHA, one limited only to claims of
discrimination occurring during a real estate transaction.
Because it creates a split of circuit authority and threatens established
civil rights protections, the Seventh Circuit's decision provides a useful
opportunity to reconsider the proper scope of the FHA. The subject of hous-
ing harassment, in general, has received significant scholarly attention in the
recent past;29 however, no commentator has focused on the concept of post-
25. See id. at 330.
26. See, e.g., George v. Colony Lake Prop. Owners Ass'n, No. 05 C 5899, 2006 WL 1735345, at *2
(N.D. 111. June 16, 2006) (addressing claim that Halprin invalidated 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2)); United
States v. Altmayer, 368 F. Supp. 2d 862, 862-63 (N.D. Ill. 2005); see also East-Miller v. Lake County
Highway Dep't, 421 F.3d 558, 562 n.l (7th Cir. 2005) (recognizing the question of § 100.400(c)(2)'s
validity left open by the decision in Halprin); Reule v. Sherwood Valley I Council of Co-Owners, Inc.,
No. Civ. A. H-05-3197, 2005 WL 2669480, at *4 n.4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2005) (stating that the court
"adopts the Seventh Circuit view that 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) is invalid").
27. See Reule, 2005 WL 2669480, at *4 n.4.
28. See, e.g., Craig Gurian, Executive Dir. of the Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro New York, Inc.,
Testimony before the New York City Council, Comm. on Gen. Welfare, Intro 22A of the Local Civil
Rights Restoration Act (Apr. 14, 2005), at 3, http://www.antibiaslaw.com/legislation/CenterTestimony
0405.pdf (arguing in favor of a local civil rights law necessitated, in part, because of decisions like
Halprin that "threaten to gut the protections of the Fair Housing Act"); Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil
Rights Under Law, Case Report: Halprin v. Prairie Family Homes of Dearborn Park Assoc., 2004 WL
2475106 (7th Cir. Nov. 4, 2004), CHI. AREA FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE NEWSL. (Chicago Area Fair
Housing Alliance, Chicago, IL), Feb. 2005, at 3, available at www.state.il.us/dhr/Housenetl Pri-
vate/CAFHA/NewsFeb_05.doc (warning about the potentially "wide-spread, negative effect" of the
Halprin decision, which "deviates from almost 40 years of common understanding and legal precedent"
on FHA issues).
29. Much of the recent academic literature in this area has addressed sexual harassment. See, e.g.,
Michelle Adams, Knowing Your Place: Theorizing Sexual Harassment at Home, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 17
(1998); Deborah Dubroff, Sexual Harassment, Fair Housing, and Remedies: Expanding Statutory
Remedies into a Common Law Framework, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 215 (1997); Theresa Keeley, An
Implied Warranty of Freedom From Sexual Harassment: The Solution for Harassed Tenants Where the
Fair Housing Act Has Failed, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 397 (2005); Nicole A. Forkenbrock Lindemyer,
Sexual Harassment on the Second Shift: The Misfit Application of Title VII Employment Standards to
Title V1II Housing Cases, 18 LAw & INEQ. 351 (2000); Maggie E. Reed et al., There's No Place Like
Home: Sexual Harassment of Low Income Women in Housing, II PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 439
(2005); Robert G. Schwemm & Rigel C. Oliveri, A New Look at Sexual Harassment Under the Fair
Housing Act: The Forgotten Role of section 3604(c), 2002 Wis. L. REv. 771; Regina Cahan, Comment,
Home is No Haven: An Analysis of Sexual Harassment in Housing, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 1061; Carlotta J.
(Vol. 58:2:203
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acquisition harassment or evaluated the validity of the underlying assump-
tion that the FHA does, in fact, protect against harassment occurring after
housing has been secured. With the current schism in federal case law as a
backdrop, and with incidents of violence, intimidation, and harassment tar-
geting minorities in housing continuing today,3° this Article reconsiders the
concept of housing discrimination and inquires whether there are solid legal
and policy justifications to continue protecting post-acquisition harassment
under the FHA.
Part II briefly reviews several restrictive judicial interpretations of the
FHA's scope, putting the Seventh Circuit's Halprin decision in context. Part
III then analyzes various arguments set forth by the Halprin court to limit
the scope of the FHA. This analysis also tracks the basic framework used by
the Supreme Court in its analysis of the FHA in Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co.,31 focusing on the text of the FHA, underlying congres-
sional intent, and the applicability of Title VII to an interpretation of the
FHA. Finally, Part IV considers two policy-based arguments bearing on
whether the FHA should be read expansively to include a post-transaction
dimension. Included in this discussion is a brief treatment of the role that
post-acquisition harassment has played in the creation and maintenance of
residential segregation. Ultimately, I reject the limiting arguments of the
Seventh Circuit and conclude that the FHA is properly interpreted as en-
compassing claims not only of pre-access discrimination but also of har-
assment occurring after occupation begins.
II. HALPRIN AND OTHER NARROW READINGS OF THE FHA
As discussed throughout the remainder of this Article, many courts con-
sidering allegations of post-acquisition harassment have concluded that such
claims are encompassed by the FHA. Not all courts agree, however. In par-
ticular, a number of courts have interpreted § 3604 in a restrictive manner,
Roos, Case Note, Dicenso v. Cisneros: An Argument for Recognizing the Sanctity of the Home in Hous-
ing Sexual Harassment Cases, 52 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1131 (1998).
30. See, e.g., Jeff Bennett, 'Mother Parks, Take Your Rest': 'Rosa May Have Lived Here, But De-
troit is Still Racist,' CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 3, 2005, at 7 (reporting that the FBI is investigating cross-
burnings at four black-owned homes in four different Detroit suburbs over the summer of 2005); Ray
Weiss, Cross Burning Doesn't Scare Family, DAYTONA BEACH NEWS J., Jan. 19, 2006, at IC (reporting
data from the Southern Poverty Law Center that approximately one cross-burning per week is reported
nationwide at a home of an interracial couple or an African-American family); Press Release, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Two Men Convicted for Criminal Interference with Housing Rights (Mar. 14, 2005),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/March/05_cr 121.htm [hereinafter March 14 Press Release] (an-
nouncing convictions of two men for "a series of racially harassing incidents," including burning a cross
near an African-American family's home, hanging a noose on their doorknob, and throwing a dead
raccoon in their yard); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement of Alice H. Martin, U.S. Attorney,
N. Dist. of Ala. (Mar. 9, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/alnl (follow "Press Releases" link to March
9, 2006 release) (describing "Operation Home Sweet Home," launched by the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice to expose and eliminate housing discrimination and reporting that areas where Hurricane Katrina
victims have relocated "have experienced a significant volume of bias-related crimes like cross burnings
or assaults on minorities").
31. 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
20061
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making it inapplicable after the housing transaction has been completed.
More troubling, perhaps, are the recent opinions in the Halprin litigation,
which significantly undercut the viability of § 3617 as a vehicle for housing
harassment claims.
A. Restrictive Interpretations of § 3604
Section 3604(a) of the FHA states, in part, that a person may not refuse
"to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny" housing on a
prohibited basis.32 In perhaps not an unreasonable reading of this language,
some courts have construed § 3604(a) as protecting only access to housing.
In a 1984 decision, for example, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
§ 3604(a) "is violated [only] by discriminatory actions, or certain actions
with discriminatory effects, that affect the availability of housing., 33 In re-
jecting the plaintiffs' claims in that case that § 3604(a) protected them post-
acquisition, the court observed that § 3604(a) "is designed to ensure that no
one is denied the right to live where they choose for discriminatory reasons,
but it does not protect... intangible interests in... already-owned property
... .,34 Echoing a similar approach, an Illinois district court recently con-
cluded that the FHA "does not create a private right of action to ensure
habitability. 35 In particular, that court held that the proper scope of
§ 3604(a) "is limited to the refusal to sell or rent housing and thus does not
apply once the property has actually been rented. 36 Noting that the plaintiff
in that case had "merely alleged discrimination in the maintenance of her
apartment and did not allege discrimination in connection with the renting
of her unit," the court held she had stated no claim under § 3604(a). 37 Sev-
eral other courts have taken similarly narrow approaches to § 3604(a), ex-
plicitly rejecting claims brought by plaintiffs for discrimination and harass-
ment occurring after occupancy began.38
32. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2000).
33. Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th
Cir. 1984).
34. Id.; see also Smart Unique Servs. Corp. v. Mortgage Correspondence of Ill., No. 94 C 1397,
1994 WL 274962, at *3 (N.D. 111. June 16, 1994).
35. Ross v. Midland Mgmt. Co., No. 02 C 8190, 2003 WL 21801023, at *4 (N.D. 111. Aug. 1, 2003).
36. Id.
37. Id. at *4. The Seventh Circuit and Illinois district court decisions referenced in this paragraph
dealt with property values and maintenance issues, respectively, not harassment allegations. See
Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n, 743 F.2d at 1210; Ross, 2003 WL 21801023, at *4. Never-
theless, the courts' discussions of § 3604(a) were not limited to those factual scenarios; instead, the
courts opined broadly on the applicability of § 3604(a) to disputes where no denial of housing exists.
38. See, e.g., Clifton Terrace Assocs. v. United Techs. Corp., 929 F.2d 714, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(explaining that § 3604(a) "reach[es] only discrimination that adversely affects the availability of hous-
ing"); Lawrence v. Courtyards at Deerwood Ass'n, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1143 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (con-
cluding that "sections 3604(a) and (b) are limited to conduct that directly impacts the accessibility to
housing because of a protected classification"); Miller v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A. 3:98-CV-2955-D,
2002 WL 230834, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2002) (concluding that because plaintiffs owned their
homes, they had no viable claim under § 3604(a)); Campbell v. City of Berwyn, 815 F. Supp. 1138,
1143 (N.D. 111. 1993) (holding that § 3604(a) claim must allege conduct detrimental to plaintiffs' ability,
as potential homebuyers or renters, to locate in a particular area or to secure housing); Laramore v. Ull.
[Vol. 58:2:203
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Section 3604(b)'s language is arguably broader than that of § 3604(a),
making it unlawful to discriminate in the "terms, conditions, or privileges of
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection therewith" because of a listed reason.39 Although this language
has been interpreted as encompassing post-acquisition claims, 40 a number of
courts have found it ambiguous enough to deny such coverage.
One area of dispute involving § 3604(b) centers on whether the phrase
"in connection therewith" refers narrowly to "the sale or rental of a dwell-
ing" or broadly to "dwelling.' Several courts have adopted the former
interpretation, requiring the alleged discrimination to have occurred at the
time of the housing transaction to trigger FHA liability; no claim of harass-
ment or discrimination occurring after the time of sale or rental would be
cognizable under § 3604(b). In Laramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities Au-
thority, for example, the district court considered this question and con-
cluded that "the most natural reading of the statute is the narrower read-
ing."42 As a result, the court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the FHA pro-
tected them against acts of alleged racial discrimination in the siting of a
sports stadium in their neighborhood.43 Several other courts have taken a
similarly narrow view of the phrase "in connection therewith" contained in
§ 3604(b).44 The most restrictive of these cases would limit the scope of
§ 3604(b) to acts of discrimination in the provision of services that actually
preclude sales or rentals of housing.45 However, none of these courts has
Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443, 452 n.5 (N.D. 111. 1989) (concluding that § 3604(a) "concerns
only 'the availability of housing"' (quoting Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n, 743 F.2d at
1209-10)).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2000).
40. See infra notes 89-91 accompanying text.
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2000).
42. 722 F. Supp. at 452.
43. Id.
44. See Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n, 743 F.2d at 1210; Ross v. Midland Mgmt. Co.,
No. 02 C 8190, 2003 WL 21801023, at *4 (N.D. 111. Aug. 1, 2003); Halprin v. Prairie Single Family
Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 208 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901 (N.D. 111. 2002), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
388 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 2004); Farrar v. Eldibany, No. 04 C 3371, 2004 WL 2392242, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 15, 2004). In support of a reading of § 3604(b) limited to pre-possession claims, the D.C. Circuit's
decision in Clifton Terrace Associates v. United Technologies Corp., 929 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1991), has
been frequently cited by courts. See, e.g., Ross, 2003 WL 21801023, at *4. Such reliance appears mis-
placed. The court in Clifton Terrace did note that § 3604(b) is "limited to services and facilities provided
in connection with the sale or rental of housing." 929 F.2d at 720. However, the court then concluded
that § 3604(b) is "directed at those who provide housing and then discriminate in the provision of atten-
dant services or facilities." Id. (emphasis added). At issue in Clifton Terrace was whether an elevator
company could face FHA liability for alleged racial discrimination in refusing to service elevators in a
low-income housing complex. Id. at 716. The D.C. Circuit concluded that FHA liability would not lie in
such a case because the responsibility of providing § 3604(b) services and facilities falls on the "provider
of housing-the owner or manager of the property," not a third party. Id. at 720. Accordingly, while the
Clifton Terrace decision does not support a broad right to post-acquisition relief under the FHA, it does
support a narrow class of post-acquisition claims-those brought against owners or managers of prop-
erty who unlawfully discriminate in the provision of services and facilities attendant to possession.
45. See Cox v. City of Dallas, No. Civ. A. 398CVI763BH, 2004 WL 370242, at *6-*8, (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 24, 2004) (concluding that "section 3604(b) applies only to discrimination in the provision of ser-
vices that precludes the sale or rental of housing"). Other courts have reigned in the scope of § 3604(b)
by concluding that the provision applies only to services generally supplied by governmental entities,
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engaged in a thorough analysis of either the relevant statutory language or
legislative intent underlying § 3604.
B. Halprin and the Roles of§§ 3604 and 3617
in Housing Harassment Litigation
Within the universe of courts narrowly construing the FHA's post-
acquisition scope, the district and appellate court decisions in the Halprin
litigation, introduced earlier, appear to be among the most restrictive.
In considering the Halprins' allegations of religious harassment, the dis-
trict court found that no viable claim existed under § 3604(a) because the
Halprins "already owned their home, and their allegations do not relate to
the availability of housing as required under section 3604(a). ' ,46 Turning to
§ 3604(b), the court rejected the Halprins' interpretation of that provision as
encompassing post-sale harassment. The Seventh Circuit, according to the
district court, has "implicitly adopted a narrow reading of the 'services or
facilities' language in § 3604(b) by describing the subsection as a 'prohibi-
tion against discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in con-
nection with the sale or rental of a dwelling."-47 Citing the D.C. Circuit "that
'services' in § 3604(b) means services in connection with the acquisition of
housing, not its maintenance, [the court determined that] § 3604[b] applies
to discrimination in services such [as] insurance and pricing that effectively
preclude ownership of housing ....
Turning to the Halprins' § 3617 claim, the district court first concluded
without analysis that where the same allegedly unlawful behavior underlies
a party's § 3617 and § 3604 claims, and where a court finds the § 3604
claim meritless, "the court should also find the § 3617 claim meritless. ' 49
Because the Halprins' § 3617 claim was founded on the same alleged be-
havior that supported their § 3604 claim, the court held that the Halprins
had failed to state a claim under § 3617 as well.50 Nevertheless, the district
court went on to substantively consider the alleged conduct under § 3617.51
Citing cases involving firebombings, physical assaults, cross-burnings, and
arson, the district court observed that § 3617 has been applied to "threaten-
such as police protection. See Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419, 424 (4th Cir. 1984);
Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n, 743 F.2d at 1210; Ross, 2003 WL 21801023, at *4.
46. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 208 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 n. I
(N.D. Ill. 2002).
47. Id. at 901 (quoting Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n, 743 F.2d at 1210) (emphasis
omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 903 (citing South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d
868, 886 (7th Cir. 1991)); Cass v. Am. Props., Inc., No. 94 C 2977, 1995 WL 132166, at *3 (N.D. I1.
Feb. 27, 1995); Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 728 (S.D. IIl. 1989).
50. Halprin, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 903.
51. See id.; see also United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 974 n.3 (D. Neb. 2004) (noting the
contradiction in the Halprin trial court's reasoning, which evaluated the severity of defendants' alleged
conduct under § 3617, despite having previously determined that no § 3617 claim could exist because
plaintiffs' § 3604 claims failed).
210 [Vol. 58:2:203
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ing, intimidating, or extremely violent discriminatory conduct designed to
drive an individual out of his home., 52 Expressing its concern not to "feder-
alize [all] dispute[s] involving residences and people who live in them,"
53
the district court concluded that the Halprins' allegations "fail to implicate
concerns expressed by Congress in the FHA," justifying dismissal of their
§ 3617 claim.
54
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit appeared to take an even narrower ap-
proach to the text of the FHA.55 Regarding the Halprins' § 3604(a) and (b)
claims, the Seventh Circuit agreed that those provisions "indicate[] concern
with activities, such as redlining, that prevent people from acquiring prop-
erty. 56 Because the Halprins were not prevented from buying and moving
into their home, the court concluded that "it is difficult to see how they can
have been interfered with in the enjoyment of any right conferred on them
by section 3604." 57 Although the court acknowledged that constructive evic-
tion resulting from one's house being burned down might trigger § 3604(b)
liability if the phrase "privileges of sale or rental" were construed to include
"the privilege of inhabiting the premises," it noted that no prior decision
recognizing post-acquisition claims contains a "considered holding on the
scope of the [FHA] in general or its application to a case like the present
one in particular.
5 8
In this context, the Seventh Circuit took special aim at cases defining
the scope of the FHA by reference to Title VII, which protects against em-
ployment discrimination. According to the court, while Title VII "protects
the job holder as well as the job applicant," the FHA "contains no hint either
in its language or its legislative history of a concern with anything but ac-
cess to housing." 59 Instead, the court opined, the FHA reflects a congres-
sional concern with the common practice of refusing to rent or sell housing
in desirable areas to members of minority groups; accordingly, because "the
focus was on their exclusion, the problem of how they were treated when
52. Halprin, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 903-04.
53. Id. at 904 (quoting United States v. Weisz, 914 F. Supp. 1050, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). This concern over potentially federalizing common, ordinary neighbor-to-
neighbor disputes arises periodically in decisions restricting the FHA to pre-access claims. See, e.g.,
Gourlay v. Forest Lake Estates Civic Ass'n, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1235-36 (M.D. Fla. 2003)
(expressing its fear that the FHA might become "an all purpose cause of action for neighbors of different
races, origins, faiths.., to bring neighborhood feuds into federal court when the dispute has little or no
actual relation to housing discrimination"), vacated by No. 8:02CVI955T30TGW, 2003 WL 22149660
(M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2003); Spom v. Ocean Colony Condo. Ass'n, 173 F. Supp. 2d 244, 251 (D.N.J.
2001) (concluding that the FHA does not "impose a code of civility" on neighbors, nor does it "require
that neighbors smile, say hello or hold the door for each other"). While there may be a certain superficial
attractiveness to this argument, it ignores the ability of judges to draw appropriate lines in hard cases.
See infra Part I.D. 1.
54. Halprin, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
55. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 2004).
56. Id. at 328.





they were included, that is, when they were allowed to own or rent homes in
such areas, was not at the forefront of congressional thinking." 6
After agreeing with the district court's conclusion that the Halprins had
no viable § 3604 claim, the Seventh Circuit observed that:
[T]his might seem to doom their claim under section 3617 as well,
because that section provides legal protection only against acts that
interfere with one or more of the other sections of the Act that are
referred to in section 3617, of which the only one even remotely
relevant to this case is section 3604.61
That would be the result, it appears, were it not for the existence of 24
C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2), a rule promulgated by HUD to implement the
FHA-a rule whose validity the defendants in Halprin never challenged in
district court.62 According to the rule, it is unlawful to threaten, intimidate,
or interfere "with persons in their enjoyment of a dwelling.', 63 Although the
Seventh Circuit opined that the rule "may stray too far from section 3617..
. to be valid," the defendants forfeited that argument.64 Noting that the Hal-
prins alleged "a pattern of harassment, invidiously motivated... [that was]
backed by the homeowners' association," the court concluded that the situa-
tion was "far from a simple quarrel between two neighbors or [an] isolated
act of harassment. ''65 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit reversed and re-
manded the case for reinstatement of the Halprins' claims under § 3617
based on the existence of 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2). 66
III. EVALUATING THE POST-ACQUISITION SCOPE OF THE FHA
Although the Halprins were allowed to go forward in the trial court, the
Seventh Circuit's decision casts serious doubt on the continued viability of
the FHA to support similar claims. Defendants in subsequent FHA lawsuits
have begun directly challenging both the post-acquisition scope of the FHA
and the validity of the HUD rule that ultimately saved the Halprins on ap-
60. Id.
61. Id. at 330. In a later case, the Seventh Circuit clarified its ruling on § 3617 in Halprin: "[W]e
held that [§ 3617] literally provided a cause of action only for plaintiffs who complain about discrimina-
tion in acquiring, rather than simply enjoying, property." Walton v. Claybridge Homeowners Ass'n, No.
06-1914, 2006 WL 2243902, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 2, 2006) (citing Halprin, 388 F.3d at 328-30).
62. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330.
63. Id.; 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2006).
64. 388 F.3d at 330. In two Seventh Circuit cases decided subsequent to Halprin involving post-
acquisition harassment under the FHA, the parties again waived the specific question of whether §
100.400(c)(2) is an invalid extension of § 3617. See Walton, 2006 WL 2243902, at *2-*3; East-Miller v.
Lake County Highway Dep't, 421 F.3d 558, 562 n.l (7th Cir. 2005).
65. 388 F.3d at 330. In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendants' argu-
ment that the claimed events are "far less ominous, frightening, or hurtful" than cases in which § 3617
claims were found to be stated, explaining that "[t]here are other, less violent but still effective, methods
by which a person can be driven from his home and thus 'interfered' with in his enjoyment of it." Id.
66. Id. at 330-31.
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peal. 67 And at least one district court appears to agree with the Seventh Cir-
cuit's narrow reading of the FHA.68 To better gauge the merits of these posi-
tions, this Part evaluates the primary concerns raised, but not thoroughly
explored, in the Seventh Circuit's decision-namely, that neither the text
nor legislative history of the FHA supports a post-acquisition dimension to
the statute, and analogies to Title VII in this context are inapposite.
A. Textual Support for a Post-Acquisition Dimension to the FHA
To determine the intended scope of the FHA, the proper starting point is
its language. 69 According to the Seventh Circuit, "the language" of the FHA
"contains no hint.., of a concern with anything but access to housing. ',70
While it is true that the FHA most clearly prohibits discriminatory conduct
that occurs prior to rental or sale, so limiting the FHA's ambit would be
possible only through an unnatural reading of the statute. In fact, the words
chosen by Congress throughout the FHA clearly suggest some post-access
scope, even if that scope is not always articulated with clarity.
Congressional intent appears obvious beginning in the FHA's defini-
tions. For example, the FHA defines a "[d]welling" not only as a structure
"intended for occupancy as[] a residence,' which presumably would be
sufficient if the FHA were focused solely on discrimination precluding sale
,72or rental, but also as a structure "which is occupied as ... a residence."
Extending FHA coverage to occupied structures necessarily creates some
post-acquisition scope for the statute. To counter this interpretation, it might
be argued that the FHA extends protection to a person who suffers discrimi-
nation in the rental process-for example, being forced to pay a higher rent
solely because of the tenant's race-even if that person actually succeeds in
securing housing. As a result, the "dwelling" discriminatorily rented out
could be actually occupied at the time of suit, making the FHA's preoccupa-
tion scope consistent with the FHA's definition of "dwelling" as including
already occupied structures.73 While this scenario is possible, the FHA suit
67. See, e.g., United States v. Altmayer, 368 F. Supp. 2d 862, 862-63 (N.D. I11. 2005); see also East-
Miller, 421 F.3d at 562 n. 1 (recognizing that the question of § 100.400(c)(2)'s validity was left open by
the decision in Halprin).
68. See Reule v. Sherwood Valley I Council of Co-Owners, Inc., No. Civ. A. H-05-3197, 2005 WL
2669480, at *4 n.4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2005) (stating that the court "adopts the Seventh Circuit view that
24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) is invalid").
69. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) ("The starting point for
[the] interpretation of a statute is always its language."); see also Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
249, 253-54 (1992) (noting that "courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means
and means in a statute what it says there").
70. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 329.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. In Williamsburg Fair Housing Committee v. New York City Housing Authority, 493 F. Supp.
1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd without opinion, 647 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1981), the district court determined
that a prima facie FHA case had been established where defendants utilized a 75/20/5 quota system for
Caucasians, Hispanics, and African-Americans, respectively. Id. at 124748. The court reached this
conclusion despite the fact that "no person was permanently denied an apartment, or rejected outright,
20061
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in such a case would likely allege discrimination in the "terms, conditions,
or privileges of sale or rental" under § 3604(b);74 that is, discrimination oc-
curring during the process of renting the dwelling. 75 At the time such dis-
crimination would have occurred, the dwelling in question would still have
been "intended for occupancy., 76 Such a scenario, then, would not justify
the FHA's inclusion of "occupied" structures within the statute's definition
of "dwelling."
The substantive prohibitions of the FHA provide further support for a
post-acquisition dimension. Beginning with § 3604,77 subsection (a) makes
it unlawful "[tlo refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer,
or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavail-
able or deny, a dwelling to any person because of' a protected status. 78 This
language has been interpreted by some courts to be "as broad as Congress
could have made it."'79 By its terms, § 3604(a) prohibits not just the im-
proper refusal to sell, rent, or negotiate-prohibitions clearly focused on
barriers to access-but also any act that makes housing "otherwise ... un-
available., 80 This broad language would prohibit, for example, the burning
down of an African-American family's recently purchased home before the
family has a chance to move in; in that scenario, § 3604(a) would apply pre-
possession. However, the language of this provision is expansive enough to
cover situations in which existing housing is subsequently made unavailable
as a result of violence or threats of violence. For example, if the home the
African-American family moves into is later destroyed by arson, housing
has been made "otherwise ... unavailable" post-acquisition. Even the Sev-
enth Circuit in Halprin appears to grudgingly recognize this possibility: "As
a purely semantic matter the statutory language might be stretched far
because of the quota." Id. at 1248; see also United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1978)
(concluding that FHA plaintiffs "need only establish that race was a consideration and played some role
in the real estate transaction"), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (2000), as recognized in, United
States v. City of Jackson, 359 F.3d 727, 737 (5th Cir. 2004).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2000).
75. See Williamsburg Fair Hous. Comm., 493 F. Supp. at 1248 (explaining that, under § 3604(b),
"[aln applicant need not actually be 'denied' a rental").
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b).
77. Beyond the cases discussed in this Part, a number of other courts have either explicitly or im-
plicitly found the FHA to extend post-acquisition. See, e.g., Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 491-92
(7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing post-acquisition scope of § 3604 in the sexual harassment context); Clifton
Terrace Assocs. v. United Techs. Corp., 929 F.2d 714, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (recognizing that § 3604(b)
addresses habitability of premises); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assoc., 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1984)
(ruling that plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of harassment under § 3604, where such harass-
ment occurred post-acquisition); Whisby-Myers v. Kiekenapp, 293 F. Supp. 2d 845, 851-52 (N.D. nll.
2003) (rejecting claim that § 3604 bars only discrimination in connection with a real estate transaction);
Marthon v. Maple Grove Condo. Ass'n, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1052 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (refusing to dismiss
plaintiffs post-acquisition disability harassment claim under § 3604); Schroeder v. De Bertolo, 879 F.
Supp. 173 (D.P.R. 1995) (same, disability context).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
79. See, e.g., Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F. Supp. 1313, 1318 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(quoting Zuch v. Hussey, 366 F. Supp. 553, 557 (E.D. Mich. 1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
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enough to reach a case of 'constructive eviction' ....,,81 Section 3604(a)
has even been suggested by a court to extend to the firebombing of an Afri-
can-American's personal property in an attempt to drive him out of a white
82neighborhood. Whether harassment in any particular case would be severe
enough to justify a legal conclusion under § 3604(a) that housing had been
made "unavailable" would be a question for the fact finder; however, there
is no textual reason to categorically reject the viability of harassment claims
under § 3604(a) simply because such claims might occur post-acquisition.
Section 3604(b) contains similarly broad pre- and post-access language,
prohibiting discrimination in the "terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connec-
tion therewith., 83 Courts and HUD have interpreted its language as covering
discriminatory practices that occur during the sales or rental process, includ-
ing discrimination in appraisals or lending, 84 the imposition of security de-
posits, 85 the setting of rental rates,86 and the utilization of a quota or prefer-
ence system, 87 among others. 88 While pre-access discrimination is clearly
prohibited by § 3604(b), its language has also been read to extend to a broad
range of post-acquisition claims. For example, denying access to pools or
other common areas 89 or to cleaning or janitorial services9° on a prohibited
basis has been held actionable under § 3604(b). In this context, the right to
occupy housing free of unlawful harassment has been held to be a protected
81. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir.
2004). An alternative reading of the Seventh Circuit's opinion might be that the FHA does protect occu-
pants of housing from acts of harassment-but only acts severe enough to result in constructive eviction.
This reading would arguably be consistent with the court's emphasis on the FHA protecting "access" to
housing. Although this interpretation might be less controversial, it does not fully and accurately reflect
the court's opinion in Halprin. The court expressly stated that the plaintiffs were "complaining not about
being prevented from acquiring property but about being harassed by other property owners," making §
3604 inapplicable. Id. According to the court, the forcing of "unwanted associations that might provoke
efforts at harassment" was not considered during passage of the FHA. Id. Although the court does refer-
ence "constructive eviction" and "expulsion" from housing, it appears unconvinced that even acts of
violence driving a family from its home would violate the terms of the FHA itself. See id. (critiquing
decisions applying the FHA to acts of harassment resulting in constructive eviction as not containing a
"considered holding on the scope of the [FHA] in general or its application to a case like the present one
in particular").
82. See Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208, 211 n.6 (N.D. i1. 1985).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
84. See, e.g., Steptoe v. Savs. of Am., 800 F. Supp. 1542, 1545-57 (N.D. Ohio 1992).
85. See, e.g., Brown v. Lo Duca, 307 F. Supp. 102, 105-06 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
86. See, e.g., Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999).
87. See, e.g., Williamsburg Fair Hous. Comm. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 493 F. Supp. 1225
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd without opinion, 647 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1981).
88. Regulations promulgated by HUD to implement the FHA provide several scenarios that would
violate both the regulations and § 3604(b), including disparate treatment with respect to rental charges,
security deposits, down payments, and the terms of a lease. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b) (2006).
89. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Cong. v. Weber, 993 F. Supp. 1286, 1292-93 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (ruling that
apartment complex rule prohibiting children from playing in common area violated § 3604(b)); United
States v. M. Westland Co., CV-93-4141, 3 Fair Hous. Fair Lend. (P-H) 15,941 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3,
1994) (same, children's use of billiards room and shuffleboard facility).
90. See HUD Preamble I, 53 Fed. Reg. 44,992, 45,001 (Nov. 7, 1988) (citing H.R. REP. No. 100-
711, at 23 (1988)) (commenting on 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(b), which prohibits discrimination in the provi-
sion of services or facilities because of handicap).
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"privilege" accompanying the sale or rental of a dwelling. In the words of
one district court, "it is difficult to imagine a privilege that flows more natu-
rally from the purchase or rental of a dwelling than the privilege of residing
therein; therefore the [FHA] should be (and has been) read to permit the
enjoyment of this privilege without discriminatory harassment." 9'
The disability provisions of § 3604 provide further textual support for a
post-access dimension to the FHA. Section 3604()(1) and (f)(2) largely
track the substantive prohibitions contained in § 3604(a) and (b), but they
apply those prohibitions to discrimination associated with a person's handi-
capped status. At least one district court has expressly addressed the post-
acquisition scope of § 3604 in the area of disability harassment. In Schroe-
der v. De Bertolo, the plaintiffs alleged that the decedent, who suffered from
mental disabilities, had been harassed and discriminated against during her
occupancy of a condominium unit.92 Defendants claimed that § 3604(f) pre-
vented discrimination "only in the sale or rental of housing accommoda-
tions., 93 Because the decedent had purchased her condominium unit, the
defendants argued, she had already exercised her right to acquire a dwelling,
taking her out of the protected ambit of § 3604(f).94 The district court, how-
ever, rejected this "narrow interpretation" of § 3604(f), holding instead that
the statute's phrase "to otherwise make unavailable or deny" served to
"sweep[] activities which go beyond the initial sale or rental transaction
under the scope of the section. 95 Once the decedent purchased her condo-
minium unit, according to the court, "her housing rights did not termi-
nate. 96 Instead, she had "the continuing right to quiet enjoyment and use of
her condominium unit and common areas in the building.,
97
Subsection () of § 3604 contains additional textual reasons to recognize
a post-acquisition dimension. For example, among other persons whose
handicap triggers FHA protection under § 3604(f)(1) and ()(2) is any "per-
son residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold,
rented, or made available."98 If the FHA were to apply only to barriers to
housing, the protections of § 3604()(1) and ()(2) should apply only where
91. United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (D. Neb. 2004); see also Halprin v. Prairie
Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that "[ilf you
bum down someone's house you make it 'unavailable' to him, and 'privileges of sale or rental' might
conceivably be thought to include the privilege of inhabiting the premises").
92. 879 F. Supp. 173, 175-76 (D.P.R. 1995).
93. Id. at 176.
94. Id.
95. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id. at 176-77.
97. Id. at 177.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(B) (2000) (emphasis added). Similarly, under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A),
discrimination occurs when there is a refusal to undertake or allow reasonable modifications to "existing
premises occupied or to be occupied by" a person with a handicap. Once again, Congress chose to ex-
tend the scope of the FHA not simply to dwellings that would be occupied at some point in the future-
which would have clearly limited the FHA to pre-access disputes--but also to "existing premises occu-
pied" presently by persons with handicaps. Id. This necessarily extends FHA protection post-access.
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a handicapped person "intend[s] to reside" 99 in the dwelling after it is sold
or rented. By explicitly including in subsection (f) any "person residing
in"' 00 such dwelling, Congress unmistakably indicated that § 3604(f) pro-
hibits discriminatory conduct occurring after occupancy begins. In fact,
judging by the lawsuits filed under § 3604(f)(1) and (2), disability harass-
ment disputes do frequently arise post-access. 01
Further evidence that the FHA is concerned with more than mere access
is found in § 3604(f)(3)'s requirement that dwellings be modified to "afford
... full enjoyment of the premises"' 10 2 or to "afford ... equal opportunity to
use and enjoy a dwelling."' 1 3 Because § 3604(f)(1) and (2) already specifi-
cally addresses denial of access and discriminatory conditions or privileges
of sale or rental, the guarantees of use and enjoyment in § 3604(f)(3) must
mean something more. °n If, instead, Congress meant to extend the FHA not
just to denials of housing but also to denials of reasonable access to hous-
ing, which would be logical in the context of disabilities, Congress could
have specifically required "reasonable access to the premises" or used simi-
lar language; it did not do so. Instead, the language chosen by Congress in
§ 3604(f)(3) is quite expansive, and it should be interpreted to mean what it
says. 105 Although the right "to use and enjoy a dwelling"' 6 might be
abridged when reasonable access to housing is denied, that right might also
be abridged post-access.
The text of § 3617 provides additional reason to interpret the FHA as
protecting more than mere "access to housing." Section 3617 makes it
unlawful "to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person" in
three contexts: (1) "in the exercise or enjoyment of... any right granted or
protected by [§§ 3604-3606 of the FHA]"; (2) "on account of his having
99. Id. § 3604(f)(1)(B), (2)(B) (emphasis added).
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. See, e.g., Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 364-65 (8th Cir. 2003) (recognizing a
FHA claim where plaintiff alleged that he suffered unwelcome harassment because of his mental disabil-
ity while he was a tenant at the defendant's apartment complex); Radecki v. Joura, 114 F.3d 115 (8th
Cir. 1997) (involving claims of harassment and unlawful eviction under § 3604(0); Anast v. Common-
wealth Apartments, 956 F. Supp. 792, 800-01 (N.D. nI. 1997) (involving claims of harassment and
unlawful eviction under § 3604(f)); Valenti v. Salz, No. 94 C 7053, 1995 WL 417547 (N.D. Ill. July 13,
1995) (involving claims of harassment and unlawful eviction under § 3604(f)); Roe v. Sugar River Mills
Assocs., 820 F. Supp. 636 (D.N.H. 1993) (involving claim of disability discrimination brought under §
3604(f) by existing tenant against landlord). For an evaluation of the competing legal obligations that
arise in the context of housing the mentally disabled, see Frederic White, Outing the Madman: Fair
Housing for the Mentally Handicapped and their Right to Privacy Versus the Landlord's Duty to Warn
and Protect, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 783, 799-802 (2001).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A).
103. Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
104. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) (citing United States v. Menasche, 348
U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)) (restating and applying the rule of construction that statutes should not be read
to "render[] some words altogether redundant").
105. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (identifying that the "first step in
interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning
with regard to the particular dispute in the case"); see also United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489
U.S. 235,240 (1989).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
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exercised or enjoyed.., any right granted or protected by [§§ 3604-3606 of
the FHA]"; or (3) "on account of his having aided or encouraged any other
person in the exercise or enjoyment of[] any right granted or protected by
[§§ 3604-3606 of the FHA]."'107 This provision, which has been interpreted
by HUD as making a "broad range of activities" unlawful, 10 8 has also been
found by courts to reach "all practices which have the effect of interfering
with the exercise of rights under the [FHA]."'0 9
It is important to recognize in this context that § 3617 expressly prohib-
its coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference "on account of [a per-
son's] having exercised or enjoyed" a right under §§ 3604-3606.11° Because
this language is couched in the past tense-the person has already "exer-
cised or enjoyed" a FHA right" '-the real estate transaction in question is
not prospective. The person either is currently in possession or was denied
housing. If the applicant were denied housing, a claim would exist under
§ 3604(a). If the person obtained housing but under discriminatory terms or
conditions, a claim would exist under § 3604(b). Assuming that § 3617 is
not intended to duplicate protection already afforded under § 3604, the only
reasonable option remaining is that the § 3617 claimant obtained housing
without suffering any discrimination and is in actual possession when the
wrongful conduct occurs. Any other reading would render at least a portion
of § 36171 12 redundant of other FHA protections. 1 3 Indeed, many-but not
107. 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
108. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3,232, 3,257 (Jan.
23, 1989) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.400) [hereinafter HUD Preamble 11].
109. United States v. Am. Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers of the Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, 442 F. Supp.
1072, 1079 (N.D. 111. 1977); see United States v. City of Hayward, 36 F.3d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 1994).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 3617. Other language in § 3617 could possibly support post-acquisition suits, as
well. For example, if a landlord threatened or intimidated Tenant A for assisting Tenant B in obtaining
legal advice for a potential FHA claim, Tenant A would have a viable § 3617 claim against the landlord
because the harassment would have occurred "on account of [Tenant A] having aided or encouraged
[Tenant B] in the exercise or enjoyment" of a fair housing right. See id. Such a claim could exist after
both Tenant A and Tenant B were in possession of their dwellings. However, suits under this language in
§ 3617 usually involve threats or intimidation directed at persons who help others obtain access to hous-
ing. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Lee County Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1301-05 (11th Cir. 1998); Stack-
house v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Meadows v. Edgewood Mgmt. Corp., 432 F.
Supp. 334, 334-35 (W.D. Va. 1977).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 3617. An additional distinction in this context has been drawn between "exercised"
and "enjoyed." See United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 979 n.8 (D. Neb. 2004). If a woman, for
example, rents an apartment and receives all the terms, privileges, and benefits as do other tenants, she
has acquired housing free from discrimination under § 3604. Id. In so doing, in the language of § 3617,
the woman has effectively "exercised" a "right granted or protected" by § 3604. See 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
Once in possession, the tenant can be seen as "enjoy[ingl" that same right. If she subsequently is threat-
ened or intimidated by her landlord because of her gender, the tenant suffers harassment because she
exercised and enjoyed her right to acquire housing free from discrimination under § 3604. Koch, 352 F.
Supp. 2d at 979 n.8. Such harassment occurring post-rental constitutes unlawful conduct on the part of
the landlord under a plain reading of § 3617.
112. Although such a narrow reading would create redundancy in the context of a post-acquisition
claim under the "on account of his having exercised or enjoyed" language of § 3617, see 42 U.S.C. §
3617, it might not necessarily do so for all claims cognizable under § 3617. For example, § 3617 prohib-
its unlawful conduct against a person "on account" of that person "having aided or encouraged any other
person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected" by §§ 3604-3606. Id. A narrow
reading of § 3617 would require there to have been an underlying act of discrimination in the occupant's
acquisition or attempted acquisition of housing; however, any claim for such discrimination under §§
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all--courts considering this issue have properly determined that § 3617
claims may exist independently," 4 and even in the absence, of a viable
claim under §§ 3604-3606. Reflecting this approach, the Ninth Circuit has
noted that § 3617 may be violated where "no discriminatory housing prac-
tice [i.e., no discrimination at the outset of occupancy] may have occurred at
all." ' 15 Under similar reasoning, one district court concluded that "[w]hether
or not the firebombing of [plaintiff's] house violated any other section of
the Fair Housing Act, this brutal act falls squarely within the parameters of
section 3617."
' 16
Some of the clearest textual evidence of the intended post-acquisition
scope of the FHA is contained in 42 U.S.C. § 3631. Although § 3631 was
passed as part of Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1968" and §§ 3601-
3604-3606 by the occupant would presumably not extend to and cover the person who "aided or encour-
aged" the occupant and who also suffered coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference "on account" of
that action. See id.
113. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (citing and applying the rule that "[a] statute should
be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous,
void or insignificant" (quoting 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 46.06, at 181-86 (rev. 6th ed. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). At one time, an advantage
did accrue to litigants separating out their § 3617 claims even where the alleged wrongful conduct oc-
curred during the course of a housing transaction. Prior to 1988, conduct violating § 3617 was not con-
sidered a "[d]iscriminatory housing practice" under the FHA, which resulted in § 3617 claims being
exempted from the FHA's statutory limitations period. See, e.g., People v. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. 1101,
1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (determining that § 3617 claim is not covered by FHA's limitations period appli-
cable to discriminatory housing practices). After the 1988 amendments to the FHA, however, § 3617
claims expressly became claims of "[d]iscriminatory housing practice[s]" under the FHA, subject to the
same limitations periods applicable to § 3604 claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(t) (2000) (defining
"[d]iscriminatory housing practice" as including "an act that is unlawful under... §§ 3604, 3605, 3606,
or 3617").
114. The question of whether a § 3617 claim is viable in the absence of a claim under §§ 3604-3606
is an especially important question in the harassment context because harassment claims can and do arise
where the plaintiff has experienced no discrimination in the actual acquisition of housing. Most, though
not all, courts addressing this question have concluded that a § 3617 claim can exist in the absence of a
pleaded claim under §§ 3604-3606. See, e.g., City of Hayward, 36 F.3d at 836; Sofarelli v. Pinellas
County, 931 F.2d 718, 722 (11th Cir. 1991); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
1283, 1288 n.5 (7th Cir. 1977) (assuming but declining "to decide whether § 3617 can ever be violated
by conduct that does not violate [§§ 3603, 3604, 3605 or 3606]"); Egan v. Schmock, 93 F. Supp. 2d
1090, 1092-93 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238, 239-43
(E.D.N.Y. 1998); Johnson v. Smith, 810 F. Supp. 235, 238-39 (N.D. 111. 1992); Stackhouse, 620 F. Supp.
at 210. However, not all courts agree. See, e.g., Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn
Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding that because the plaintiffs were found to have
no claim under § 3604, "this might seem to doom their claim under section 3617 as well, because that
section provides legal protection only against acts that interfere with one or more of the other sections of
the Act that are referred to in section 3617"); Frazier v. Rominger, 27 F.3d 828, 834 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that § 3617 "prohibits the interference with the exercise of Fair Housing rights only as enumer-
ated in [§§ 3603-3606], which define the substantive violations of the Act"). This comment has been
interpreted as suggesting that "plaintiffs, once having secured their housing, have no right under the
FHA to be free from interference with the peaceful enjoyment of their home by one not associated with
its sale or rental." Ohana, 996 F. Supp. at 241.
115. City of Hayward, 36 F.3d at 836 (quoting Smith v. Stechel, 510 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir.
1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Seaphus v. Lilly, 691 F. Supp. 127, 139 (N.D. ill.
1988) (concluding that a § 3617 claim could lie where plaintiff allegedly suffered racial harassment after
purchasing a home); Waheed v. Kalafut, No. 86 C 6674, 1988 WL 9092, at *4 (N.D. I1. Feb. 2, 1988)
(holding that firebombing of plaintiffs home fell within the scope of conduct prohibited by § 3617).
116. Stirgus v. Benoit, 720 F. Supp. 119, 123 (N.D. 111. 1989).
117. 114 CONG. REC. 5983-6003 (1968); see Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative
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3619 were originally passed as Title VIII of the same Act, § 3631 is fre-
quently cited as part of the FHA." 8 Section 3631 makes it a crime to use
force or the threat of force to injure, intimidate, or interfere with a person in
their exercise of various housing rights.1 9 To violate § 3631, the wrongful
conduct must be "because of [the] race, color, religion, sex, handicap ....
familial status .... or national origin [of the person]" and must occur "be-
cause [the person] is or has been selling, purchasing, renting, financing,
occupying, or contracting or negotiating for the sale, purchase, rental, fi-
nancing or occupation of any dwelling."120 The breadth of this congres-
sional language is important.1 21 Congress chose to bring within the ambit of
§ 3631 not simply illegal acts aimed at persons attempting to gain access to
housing ("contracting or negotiating for the sale, purchase, rental, financing
or occupation") but also such acts directed at persons already in possession
of housing ("occupying"). 22 Indeed, many-if not most-prosecutions un-
der § 3631 arise in the post-acquisition context and involve actual or threat-
ened physical assaults or other forms of harassment.
23
All of the statutory language discussed in this section124 demonstrates
that Congress must have intended the FHA to address housing disputes be-
History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1968); Comment, The Federal Fair Housing Re-
quirements: Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 1969 DUKE L.J. 733, 750 n.87.
118. The fair housing statutory provisions appear in chapter 45 of Title 42 of the United States Code.
Subchapter I of the chapter is entitled, "Generally" and contains §§ 3601 through 3619. Subchapter II is
subtitled, "Prevention of Intimidation" and contains § 3631. Chapter 45 has been organized this way
since the sections first appeared in the United States Code. The placement of § 3631 in the chapter of the
Code titled Fair Housing suggests that Congress intended it to be part of what was eventually referred to
as the FHA even though it was not part of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The confusion may
stem simply from the fact that Title VIII was drafted by the House and Title IX was added by the Senate.
Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act, § 3631 has been cited as part of the FHA. See, e.g., Preferred
Props., Inc. v. Indian River Estates, Inc., 276 F.3d 790, 794 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing the FHA as 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3631); Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); Comer v.
Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 781 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); Gibson v. County of Riverside, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1057,
1062 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (same). Substantive amendments to § 3631 in 1974 and 1988 also tracked those to
Title VIII. The text of Public Law 103-322, section 320103(e) also supports this argument. It reads,
"Section 901 of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3631) is amended." Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320103(e), 108 Stat. 1796, 2110.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (2000).
120. Id. § 3631(a) (emphasis added).
121. For a treatment of how § 3631's legislative history bears on the FHA's post acquisition scope,
see infra notes 252-267 and accompanying text.
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Vartanian, 245 F.3d 609, 611 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding conviction
under § 3631 based on threats of injury and death associated with a black family's purchase of a home in
a white neighborhood); United States v. Hartbarger, 148 F.3d 777, 779 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding con-
viction for burning cross in yard of black family in white neighborhood), overruled on other grounds,
United States v. Colvin, 353 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Mclnnis, 976 F.2d 1226,
1228-29 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding conviction for firing rifle into home of black family); United States
v. Wood, 780 F.2d 955, 961-62 (11 th Cir. 1986) (upholding conviction for physical attacks because of
the victims' association with persons of other races in their homes); see also United States v. Hayward, 6
F.3d 1241, 1250 (7th Cir. 1993) (identifying as the purpose of § 3631(b) the protection of a person's
right to associate with others in his home without regard to race), overruled on other grounds, United
States v. Colvin, 353 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2003).
124. The FHA's post-acquisition scope is reflected in other parts of the statute as well. For example,
§ 3605 prohibits discrimination in the lending of money "for purchasing, constructing, improving, re-
pairing, or maintaining a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b)(1)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). While it is
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yond simple denials of accommodation. 25 At this surface level, then, the
FHA's language is inconsistent with the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that
the FHA contains "no hint . . . of a concern with anything but access to
housing."' 126 In particular, the plain language of § 3617 appears specifically
to reach harassment and intimidation occurring post-acquisition. Where
there is such textual clarity, there is no requirement that a court delve into
the morass of a statute's legislative history; in such a case, in fact, resorting
to legislative history is contra-indicated. 27 Nevertheless, and because the
precise scope of the FHA's language may be open to reasonable debate, the
legislative history of the FHA should be considered when attempting to
define the contours of the statue's protections.
28
possible that a purchaser of a dwelling might improve, repair, or maintain that dwelling before ever
actually moving into it, a more reasonable interpretation of this statutory language is that it applies post-
acquisition. Indeed, if a new owner of a dwelling were being loaned money to repair or maintain the
dwelling pre-access, it is likely that the loan for repair or maintenance would be folded into the loan
amount for the purchase price of the dwelling.
125. Even if the text of the FHA is not construed to extend post-acquisition, § 100.400(c)(2) of
HUD's rules explicitly prohibits "[t]hreatening, intimidating or interfering with persons in their enjoy-
ment of a dwelling." See 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2006) (emphasis added). Although the Halprin
court remanded the plaintiffs' claims because of the existence of this rule, it appeared to do so reluc-
tantly, noting that "[tihe regulation may stray too far from section 3617 ... to be valid." Halprin v.
Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004). Following the
Seventh Circuit's lead, litigants in subsequent FHA disputes have directly attacked the validity of §
100.400(c)(2). See, e.g., United States v. Altmayer, 368 F. Supp. 2d 862, 862-63 (N.D. I1. 2005). The
only federal decision to express an opinion on the validity of the rule post-Halprin concluded, without
explanation, that the rule is invalid because it applies post-acquisition. See Reule v. Sherwood Valley I
Council of Co-Owners, Inc., No. Civ. A. H-05-3197, 2005 WL 2669480, at *4 n.4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 19,
2005). This Article does not separately evaluate the validity of § 100.400(c)(2); however, one of the
central questions in such an evaluation would be whether the FHA protects occupancy or enjoyment of a
dwelling, which is the central focus of this Article. Under a full analysis, § 100.400(c)(2) would appear
likely to survive as a "reasonable interpretation" of the FHA, particularly since an agency's construction
of a statute it administers is entitled to "considerable weight." See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984). This is especially true because courts "normally accord
particular deference to an agency interpretation of 'longstanding' duration." See Barnhart v. Walton, 535
U.S. 212, 220 (2002) (quoting North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 n.12 (1982)). Section
100.400(c)(2) was promulgated in its current form in 1989. See HUD Preamble 1I, supra note 108, at
3291. Furthermore, both § 100.400(c)(2) and other HUD rules reflect a consistent interpretation of the
FHA by HUD to include at least some post-acquisition coverage. For example, HUD's rules refer to
"sale, rental or occupancy" of dwellings, 24 C.F.R. § 100.10(a)(1) (emphasis added), unlawfully failing
to make necessary repairs or delaying such repairs, id. § 100.65(b)(2), and improperly denying loans for
the maintenance of dwellings, id. § 100.125(a).
126. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 329.
127. See Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 216 (2005) (concluding that silence in legislative
history does not justify modification of statute's clear text); Bamhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 401
(1992) (appeals to legislative history are well taken only to resolve statutory ambiguity).
128. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65 n.l (2004) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) ("(C]ommon sense suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing additional information rather than
from ignoring it." (quoting Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 611 n.4 (1991)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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B. Legislative History of the FHA
1. Social Context and Enactment
In the years immediately preceding the 1968 enactment of the FHA,
significant racial tension gripped the country. 129 Civil rights advocates and
members of minority groups were attacked and killed, 130 sometimes by po-
lice, 131 and race riots, with both physical and human tolls, exploded in U.S.
cities from Los Angeles to Newark. 3 2 Problems between racial groups were
so severe in the early 1960s that President Kennedy labeled racial discrimi-
nation "a moral issue" facing the United States. 133 In response, the federal
government exerted pressure to force desegregation and integration. 34 A
129. For a more in-depth discussion of the social context of the FHA and the sequence of the events
leading to its passage, see Dubofsky, supra note 117; Historical Overview-Equal Opportunity in Hous-
ing, 1 Fair Hous. Fair Lend. (P-H) 2301, at 2312-14 (1993) [hereinafter Historical Overview]; Robert
G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair Housing Act, 54 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 199, 207-12
(1978); and Comment, supra note 117, at 749-50.
130. In 1963, for example, civil rights leader Medgar Evers was killed by a sniper. Emanuel Perlmut-
ter, Mississippi Victim Lived With Peril in His Job; Leader's Wife Remains Determined, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 1963, at 12. During the same year, bombings at an Alabama church known for civil rights
activism killed four young, black girls. John Herbers, Funeral is Held for Bomb Victims; Dr. King De-
livers Tribute of Rites in Birmingham; Points to 'Evil System'; 300 Ready to March, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 1963, at 17. In 1964, three civil rights workers were killed in Mississippi by members of the Ku Klux
Klan. Claude Sitton, Chaney Was Given a Brutal Beating; Re-examination is Made of Slain Rights
Worker, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1964, at 7. In 1966, civil rights protesters marched against housing dis-
crimination in Chicago and met with violent opposition. Donald Janson, Dr. King and 500 Are Jeered by
Whites in 5-Mile Chicago March, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1966, at 1. In 1968, Rev. Martin Luther King,
Jr. was assassinated. Paul Hoffman, National Political, Labor and Religious Leaders Mourn Dr. King,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1968, at 27.
131. In 1965, fifty civil rights marchers were hospitalized after police in Alabama blocked their
access to a bridge and then used tear gas, whips, and clubs on the marchers. Roy Reeds, Alabama Police
Use Gas and Clubs to Rout Negroes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1965, at 1.
132. In 1963, race riots in Maryland prompted the imposition of modified martial law. Hedrick
Smith, Martial Law is Imposed in Cambridge, Md., N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1963, at 1. In 1965, riots broke
out in the Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles, eventually resulting in numerous deaths. Peter Bart,
2,000 Troops Enter Los Angeles on Third Day of Negro Rioting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1965, at 1. In
1967, twenty-three people were killed in race riots in Newark and forty-three were killed in riots in
Detroit. Other cities, including Washington, Kansas City, Chicago, and Baltimore, also suffered through
violent race riots. Sydney H. Schanberg, Sociologists Say Latest Riots Differ From Those of the Past,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1965, at 17.
133. John F. Kennedy, President of the U.S., Radio and Television Report to the American People on
Civil Rights (June 11, 1963) (transcript available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources
/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03CivilRightsO6l11963 .htm).
134. The Executive Branch was active in civil rights causes. In 1962, for example, President Ken-
nedy ordered 400 federal marshals to oversee the matriculation of the University of Mississippi's first
black student, amid race riots that killed two and injured 300. See Tom Dent, Portrait of Three Heroes,
reprinted in REPORTING CIVIL RIGHTS: PART ONE 845, 845-56 (Library of Am. 2003); Kenneth L.
Dixon, Courthouse Square is Authentic Picture of Occupied Town, THE MERIDIAN STAR, Oct. 2, 1962,
at 1, reprinted in REPORTING CIVIL RIGHTS, supra, at 669, 669-70; George B. Leonard et al., How a
Secret Deal Prevented a Massacre at Ole Miss, reprinted in REPORTING CIVIL RIGHTS, supra, at 671,
671-701. Also in that year, President Kennedy issued Executive Order No. 11063, which prohibited
racial discrimination in federally owned housing. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,527 (Nov.
20, 1962). importantly for present purposes, this executive order expressly protected "occupancy" of
housing. Id. The courts were also involved in race issues. For example, in 1967, sixteen states that pro-
hibited interracial marriage were forced by the United States Supreme Court to revise their state laws.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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significant component of the government's efforts to address racial tension
was introduction and enactment of civil rights legislation in the 1960s.
135
The cause of federal housing legislation, in particular, was advanced by
publication of the National Advisory Commission's Report on Civil Disor-
ders on March 1, 1968.136 The report stated in stark terms that "[o]ur nation
is moving toward two societies, one black, one white-separate and un-
equal."' 137 Among the commission's various recommendations was that a
comprehensive and enforceable open housing law be enacted. 138
Fair housing legislation was first introduced in Congress by the Johnson
Administration in 1966.139 Although both the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees held extensive hearings on the proposed legislation, only the
House Committee reported out an amended bill, which the full House sub-
sequently passed. 140 The Senate never voted on fair housing legislation in
1966. 4 1 The following year, President Johnson tried once again, introducing
a fair housing bill similar to the 1966 version. 142 In 1967, however, the
House Judiciary Committee reported out a version of the President's pro-
posed legislation that did not contain any fair housing provisions; 143 instead,
that version, numbered H.R. 2516, addressed only protection of civil rights
workers. 144 H.R. 2516 was passed by the House in late 1967.1
45
During the Senate's consideration of H.R. 2516, Senators Walter Mon-
dale and Edward Brooke offered a floor amendment inserting fair housing
guarantees into the bill. Although there were no committee hearings on the
newly amended H.R. 2516, a subcommittee of the Senate Banking and Cur-
rency Committee had considered and reviewed the same language in August
of 1967.146 Heated debate on the Senate floor ensued.147 In an effort to reach
135. For example, in 1965 President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, enacting the most
sweeping civil rights legislation enacted since Reconstruction. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000h (2000)). Also that year, President Johnson proposed and Congress
passed a voting rights bill, prohibiting, among other things, the use of literacy tests for voter registration,
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000)).
136. See Dubofsky, supra note 117, at 158; Schwemm, supra note 129, at 208.
137. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968) [hereinafter CIVIL DISORDERS].
138. Id. at 263.
139. See Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of Persons Within the Jurisdiction of
the United States: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1048-55
(1966) [hereinafter Miscellaneous Proposals] (letter from President Lyndon B. Johnson).
140. See 112 CONG. REC. INDEX 1183 (1966); Historical Overview, supra note 129, at 2312.
141. See 114 CONG. REC. 23,019-45 (1968); Comment, supra note 117, at 749 n.84.
142. See H.R. 5700 & S. 1026, 90th Cong. (1967); Schwemm, supra note 129, at 208.
143. 113 CONG. REC. 17,975 (reporting bill).
144. Schwemm, supra note 129, at 207-08.
145. Id. at 208.
146. Hearings on S. 1358, S. 2114 and S. 2280 Relating to Civil Rights and Housing Before the
Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. 5
(1967) [hereinafter Civil Rights and Housing]; Schwemm, supra note 129, at 208 n.59; Comment, supra
note 117, at 750 n.86.
147. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REc. 23,019-45 (1968) (including Sen. Ervin's description of enforcement
procedures contained in the Mondale-Brooke amendment as "rank a proposed prostitution of the judicial
process as has ever been [put forward] in [this] nation"); see Comment, supra note 117, at 750 n.87.
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a compromise bill with broader support for fair housing, the Mondale-
Brooke amendment was eventually tabled in early 1968 to allow for a sub-
stitute amendment offered by Senator Everett Dirksen. 148 The Dirksen sub-
stitute also faced significant opposition. 149 The Senate ultimately passed
H.R. 2516, containing the Dirksen substitute on fair housing, on March 11,
1968 by a vote of 71 to 20.150 Additional support for H.R. 2516 was gar-
nered, to a large extent, by publication of the National Advisory Commis-
sion's Report on Civil Disorders ten days before the Senate vote. 5'
After returning to the House on March 14, 1968, H.R. 2516 was sent to
the House Rules Committee, where fears increased that the civil rights bill
would die. 152 On April 4, 1968, however, Dr. Martin Luther King was as-
sassinated. 153 That event, coupled with the ensuing social unrest, helped
motivate the Rules Committee to report out the Senate version of H.R. 2516
without additional House amendments and without affording any other
members of the House the opportunity to offer additional amendments.
154
As the House undertook final debate on H.R. 2516, National Guard troops
preparing for possible riots in Washington were waiting in the basement of
the Capitol. 155 After just an hour's debate, the House passed H.R. 2516,
which contained the Dirksen substitute on fair housing, on April 10,
1968.156 President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1968 into law on
April 11, 1968.15
At least two observations can be drawn from the process of enacting the
FHA as well as its social context. First, enactment of the FHA resulted, in
part, from enormous social pressure. Significant and building racial ten-
sions, grounded in concerns about unequal employment and housing oppor-
tunities, helped motivate passage of fair housing legislation in 1968 after the
legislation had been largely stalled for two years. Second, passage of the
FHA did not involve thoughtful, meticulous drafting or consideration of the
statute's language. In fact, one commentator has referred to the "rather cha-
otic circumstances under which the law was passed."' 158 Because the opera-
tive FHA language was adopted from floor amendments in the Senate,
committee reports and other traditional sources of legislative history are
unavailable. 159 In the words of the Third Circuit, the FHA's legislative his-
148. Dubofsky, supra note 117, at 155-58. Because it was introduced on the Senate floor, no Senate
committee report exists considering the Dirksen substitute. See Comment, supra note 117, at 750 n.86.
149. Dubofsky, supra note 117, at 157-58.
150. See 114 CONG. REC. 5,983-6,003 (1968); Dubofsky, supra note 117, at 159; Comment, supra
note 117, at 750 n.87.
151. See Dubofsky, supra note 117, at 158; Schwemm, supra note 129, at 208.
152. See Dubofsky, supra note 117, at 160.
153. Hoffman, supra note 130.
154. Dubofsky, supra note 117, at 160.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000).
158. Schwemm, supra note 129, at 209.
159. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147 n.29 (3d Cir. 1977); Schwemm, supra note
129, at 209. Traditionally, the reports of legislative committees involved in drafting a statute and steering
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tory is "somewhat sketchy,' '" r ° and according to the Supreme Court, that
same history is "not too helpful' 6I as a guide to the statute's meaning. With
an appreciation of both the social context that generated the FHA as well as
the limitations of the statute's legislative history, the remainder of this Part
evaluates available historical material in an effort to determine whether
Congress intended the FHA to embody post-acquisition coverage.
2. Congressional Intent and Motivation
The historical record reveals that the primary focus during debate over
fair housing legislation from 1966 to 1968 was the elimination of de facto
racial segregation in housing-"a malady so widespread and so deeply
imbedded in the national psyche that many Americans, Negroes as well as
whites, have come to regard it as a natural condition" 162-and its impacts on
minority education, employment opportunities, and related issues. In his
1966 letter accompanying the initial draft of fair housing legislation, Presi-
dent Johnson focused on the critical role played by housing in alleviating
the plight of many minorities:
All the links-poverty, lack of education, underemployment and
now discrimination in housing-must be attacked together. If we
are to include the Negro in our society, we must do more than give
him the education he needs to obtain a job and a fair chance for use-
ful work. We must give the Negro the right to live in freedom
among his fellow Americans. 1
63
As explained by Representative Emanuel Celler during House debate over
the FHA two years later, "Segregated housing isolates racial minorities from
the public life of the community [and] means inferior public education, rec-
reation, health, sanitation, and transportation services and facilities, and
often means denial of access to training and employment and business op-
it through Congress are principally relied upon when evaluating legislative history. See United States v.
Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 186 (2d Cir. 2002); In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 912 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining
that "official committee reports ... provide the authoritative expression of legislative intent"); Mills v.
United States, 713 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1983) (opining that "committee reports represent the most
persuasive indicia of Congressional intent (with the exception, of course, of the language of the statute
itself)").
160. Resident Advisory Bd., 564 F.2d at 147.
161. See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).
162. 114 CONG. REC. 2280 (1968) (statement of Sen. Edward W. Brooke) (quoting Civil Rights and
Housing, supra note 146, at 298).
163. Miscellaneous Proposals, supra note 139, at 1053 (letter from President Lyndon B. Johnson)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Similar sentiments have echoed in the writing of commentators. See,
e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 2 (1993) ("Because of racial segregation, a significant share of black
America is condemned to experience a social environment where poverty and joblessness are the norm,
where a majority of children are born out of wedlock, where most families are on welfare, where educa-
tional failure prevails, and where social and physical deterioration abound.").
2006]
Alabama Law Review
portunities." '64 Calling segregation "deeply corrosive both for the individ-
ual and for his community," Representative Celler observed the appalling
effects of segregation, such as deteriorated housing, crime, disease, and high
infant mortality. 65 During earlier Senate debate, Senator Walter Mondale
voiced a similar sentiment: "Declining tax base, poor sanitation, loss of
jobs, inadequate educational opportunity, and urban squalor will persist as
long as discrimination forces millions to live in the rotting cores of central
cities."' 66 In the words of Senator Brooke, the FHA would "make it possible
for those who have the resources to escape the stranglehold now suffocating
the inner cities of America.'
1 67
In debating the need for fair housing legislation, lawmakers also fo-
cused on the subjective impact of the ghetto. As Congress heard during tes-
timony on the FHA, "The real evil in the ghetto effects is the rejection and
humiliation of human beings .... [A] sense of humiliation goes all through
the ghetto.' ' 168 In Senator Mondale's view, fair housing legislation would
have "great practical psychological significance to the Negro who has 'tried
harder' and yet remains trapped in the ghetto for a lifetime.' 69 Segregated
housing, he explained, "is the simple rejection of one human being by an-
other without any justification but superior power; we have closed our
hearts to our fellow human beings to the extent that we have closed our
neighborhoods to them."'
' 70
While the broader effects of segregation were clearly of concern to
Congress, it is undeniable that the primary legislative focus during this
process was to ensure nondiscriminatory access to housing. As a semantic
matter, this emphasis is demonstrated by repeated shorthand references dur-
ing congressional debates to the FHA as an "open housing" law, suggesting
164. To Prescribe Penalties for Certain Acts of Violence or Intimidation: Hearings Before the H.
Comm. on Rules, 90th Cong. 4 (1968) (statement of Rep. Emmanuel Celler).
165. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CivIL RIGHTS PART II
1786 (1970).
166. 114 CONG. REC. 2274 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale); see also Civil Rights and
Housing, supra note 146, at 128 (statement of Reverend Robert F. Drinan, Dean, Boston College Law
School) ("As is well known, Congress in 1957, 1960, 1964, and 1965 has pledged itself to the eradica-
tion of discrimination in education, employment, voting, and other crucial areas. But it seems to me that
the failure of Congress to enact a fair housing law constitutes an indefensible omission in a series of
interlocking laws designed to guarantee equality of opportunity."); 114 CONG. REC. 2276 (1968) (dis-
cussing testimony before Congress relating to the disproportionate location of new businesses in subur-
ban areas and the failure of inner-city schools to adequately educate minority children); id. at 3421
("[F]air housing is one more step toward achieving equality in opportunity and education for the Ne-
gro."); id. at 3422 ("It is impossible to ga[u]ge the degradation and humiliation suffered by a man in the
presence of his wife and children-when he is told that despite his university degrees, despite his income
level, despite his profession, he is just not good enough to live in a white neighborhood.").
167. 114 CONG. REC. 2279 (1968) (statement of Sen. Edward W. Brooke); see also id. at 2707
(statement of Sen. Philip A. Hart) ("This problem of where a family lives, where it is allowed to live, is
inextricably bound up with better education, better jobs, economic motivation, and good living condi-
tions.").
168. 114 CONG. REC. 2281 (1968) (testimony of Sen. Walter F. Mondale) (quoting Civil Rights and
Housing, supra note 146, at 179 (testimony of Algernon D. Black, American Civil Liberties Union))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
169. 114 CONG. REC. 3421 (1968) (testimony of Sen. Walter F. Mondale).
170. Id. at 3422.
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a focus on initial access to accommodation. As explained by Attorney Gen-
eral Ramsey Clark during congressional testimony in 1967, the proposed
legislation would provide "open housing, housing unrestricted. It will elimi-
nate widespread forced housing where racial minorities are barred from
residential areas and confined to the ghetto and other segregated areas.''
Senator Philip Hart echoed this sentiment, explaining that the legislation
would "create a national policy of open housing that will greatly facilitate
movement of people free from the artificial barriers of racial restrictions.' 72
References to "open housing" legislation were also contained in the 1968
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, which
helped spur Congress to finally pass the FHA. 173 In particular, the report
specifically recommended that Congress enact a "comprehensive and en-
forceable federal open housing law" to help curb the racial violence plagu-
ing the country.
174
Although the "open housing" label strongly suggests a focus on access
to housing, the substance of congressional testimony received on the pro-
posed legislation makes that focus absolutely clear. Over the course of thou-
sands of pages of subcommittee, committee, and floor discussion of fair
housing legislation from 1966 to 1968, members of Congress and others
repeatedly described the legislation as targeting the sale and rental of hous-
ing. For example, when President Johnson first proposed a fair housing bill
in 1966, his accompanying letter to Congress explicitly described the legis-
lation as "cover[ing] the sale, rental and financing of all dwelling units."'
175
During the same year, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach explained
that the fair housing bill targeted, among other things, "discriminatory prac-
tices in the sale, rental or financing of housing.' 76 In testimony on fair
171. Civil Rights and Housing, supra note 146, at 6 (statement of Att'y Gen. Ramsey Clark).
172. Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 1026, S. 1318, S. 1359, S. 1362, S. 1462,
H.R. 2516 and H.R. 10805 Before the Subcomm. on Const. Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong. 479 (1967) [hereinafter Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967] (statement of Sen. Philip A. Hart); see
id. at 59 (statement of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr.) (referring to the "so-called open-housing title"); id. at 417
(statement of Whitney M. Young, Jr., Executive Director, National Urban League) ("But open housing is
not just at issue for the Negro. It is a matter affecting the welfare of the total society. Without dispersal
of the ghetto population, there can be no real solution to any of our urban problems."); 114 CONG. REC.
2086 (1968) (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (referencing the need for "a Federal open-housing
law"); id. at 2707 (statement of Sen. Philip A. Hart) (discussing the need for "favorable action on open
housing").
173. See, e.g., CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 137, at 263-64. Although the commission report also
referenced "open occupancy" legislation as synonymous with "open housing" legislation, the report
appeared clearly focused on ensuring access, not occupancy. See id. at 263 (stating that an "open-
occupancy law" would "mak[e] it an offense to discriminate in the sale or rental of any housing").
174. Id. at 263.
175. Miscellaneous Proposals, supra note 139, at 1054 (letter from President Lyndon B. Johnson)
(emphasis omitted). In the same letter, President Johnson urged Congress "to declare a national policy
against racial discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, and to create effective remedies against that
discrimination in every part of America." Id. at 1049.
176. Id. at 1057 (statement of Att'y Gen. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach). The House of Representatives
Committee of the Judiciary Report accompanying H.R. 14765 in 1966 also described the fair housing
proposal as "prohibit[ing] ... discriminat[ion] on grounds of race, color, religion, and national origin in
the sale, rental, or financing of ... dwellings." H.R. REP. No. 89-1678, pt. 2, at 15 (1966).
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housing legislation from 1967, numerous witnesses, including Attorney
General Ramsey Clark, 17 7 the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Robert Weaver,178 and the Dean of Boston College Law School, 179 focused
on the proposed legislation's application to commercial transactions involv-
ing the sale or rental of housing. In February of 1968, as the Senate under-
took final consideration of the FHA, Senator Mondale described the legisla-
tion as an important step, though "[o]utlawing discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing will not free those trapped in ghetto squalor."' 80 Numerous
other statements, including those by Senator Brooke,1
8
1 Senator Kennedy, 82
Senator Hart, 183 and Senator Tydings,184 made during congressional consid-
eration of the bill in 1968, focused clearly guaranteeing nondiscriminatory
access to housing.1
85
Beyond explicit references to sales and rentals of housing, the legisla-
tive history of the FHA is filled with related references to commercial hous-
186 18ing transactions, examples of unfair exclusion from housing, 87 discus-
sions of racial segregation' 88 and the remedy of promoting integration,1
89
177. Civil Rights and Housing, supra note 146, at 5 (statement of Att'y Gen. Ramsey Clark).
178. Id. at 29 (statement of Robert C. Weaver, Sec'y of HUD) ("This is a comprehensive proposal
which would prohibit discrimination in the sale, rental, or financing of housing, including discriminatory
advertising and discrimination in representations made as to the availability of housing.").
179. Id. at 132 (statement of Reverend Robert F. Drinan, Dean, Boston College Law School) ("[Tihe
enactment of this bill ... would bring to the Nation a nationally guaranteed right to purchase or rent a
home regardless of one's race.").
180. 114 CONG. REC. 2274 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale).
181. Id. at 2279 (statement of Sen. Edward W. Brooke) ("Millions of Americans have been denied
fair access to decent housing because of their race or color. If we perceive this reality, on what possible
grounds can we delay the evident remedy?").
182. Id. at 2085-86 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy). In concluding that the "insidious effect
of discrimination in housing is incalculable," Senator Kennedy quoted the Civil Rights Commission
from 1967: "Even Negroes who can afford the housing in [the suburbs] have been excluded by the
racially discriminatory practices not only of property owners themselves, but also of real estate brokers,
builders, and the home finance industry." Id. at 2085.
183. Id. at 2707 (statement of Sen. Philip A. Hart) ("The best spokesman for this bill would be a
Negro father who had worked hard all his life, saved diligently, had gone out and then had come back
that night, and had to explain to his children why he had not been able to get the house.").
184. Id. at 2533 (1968) (statement of Sen. Josephy Tydings) ("Basically, what the law would do is
make it possible for all citizens to buy decent houses without discrimination against them because of the
color of their skin.").
185. A summary of the Dirksen substitute, id. at 4906-08, which was almost identical to the final
version of the FHA passed by Congress, prepared by the U.S. Department of Justice and included in the
Congressional Record, explained that the fair housing portion of the bill was designed "to assure the
availability of most housing in the United States to all persons, without discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion or national origin," id. at 4907. See also Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967, supra
note 172, at 289 (colloquy between Sen. Edward M. Kennedy and Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., General Counsel,
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights); H.R. REP. No. 89-1678, pt. 2, at 15 (1966).
186. Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967, supra note 172, at 80 (statement of Att'y Gen. Ramsey
Clark) ("Title IV is aimed at commercial transactions: at the 'for sale' and 'for rent' signs which pro-
claim to all that housing is available to whomever makes the best offer."); Civil Rights and Housing,
supra note 146, at 131 (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale) ("[Tlhis bill ... is designed to deal with
property offered to the public for sale. So, almost by definition, it is a public transaction that is in-
volved.").
187. Civil Rights and Housing, supra note 146, at 78 (statement of Frankie M. Freeman, U.S.
Comm'n on Civil Rights).
188. Hearing on S. 3296, Amendment 561 to S. 3296, S. 1497, S. 1654, S. 2845, S. 2846, S. 2923 and
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calls for providing equal opportunity 90 and fair competition for housing,' 9'
urgings for the removal of discrimination as a barrier to housing,' 92 and the
need to provide an entry into a housing market described as "virtually
closed.',
193
The picture that emerges from the FHA's legislative history is a broad
concern with segregation and its related consequences, with a particular
focus on ensuring non-discriminatory access to housing. But was Congress
concerned only with access? Is it fair and accurate to conclude that the Act's
legislative history reveals "no hint... of a concern with anything but access
to housing"?194 Or, might the FHA have been intended as a broad, remedial
statute addressing access and other housing practices that could perpetuate
segregation and discourage integration? To resolve these questions from the
perspective of legislative intent, we must go beyond general statements
about access in the legislative record to search out specific evidence reflect-
ing the precise contours of the FHA as intended by Congress.
3. Policy Statements as Guides to the FHA 's Scope
The FHA's "Declaration of policy" states, "It is the policy of the United
States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing through-
out the United States."'' 95 This concise, general guarantee was added as part
S. 3170 Before the Subcomm. on Const. Rights of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 82 (1966)
[hereinafter Civil Rights: Hearing on S. 3296] (statement of Att'y Gen. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach)
(explaining, in support of the proposed fair housing legislation, the need to address "enforced housing in
segregated ghettos of vast numbers of Negro citizens"); Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967, supra note
172, at 79 (statement of Att'y Gen. Ramsey Clark) (explaining that "[pirimarily because of housing
discrimination, more persons are living in segregated sections of cities today than ever before"); Civil
Rights and Housing, supra note 146, at 423 (statement of Andres Heiskell, Chairman of the Board,
Urban America) ("It is no exaggeration to say that we are now at the point where the social, economic,
and physical future of our metropolitan complexes is dependent on the elimination of racial segrega-
tion.").
189. Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967, supra note 172, at 425 (statement of Whitney M. Young, Jr.,
Executive Dir., National Urban League) ("Integration provides an opportunity for white citizens to help
prepare their children in a natural, diversified setting for the world they're going to live in .... For a
youngster to grow up today with no knowledge of social diversity in a world which is two-thirds non-
white is a terrible handicap."); Civil Rights and Housing, supra note 146, at 128 (statement of Reverend
Robert F. Drinan, Dean, Boston College Law School) (explaining that "the guarantee of integrated
housing for Negroes is the one great commitment which Congress has still refused to make"); H.R. REP.
No. 89-1678, pt. 2, at 59 (minority views of the Hon. Basil L. Whitener) (stating that the proposed bill
was intended to "provide adequate and integrated housing for minority groups").
190. H.R. REP. No. 89-1678, pt. 2, at 19 (statements of Hon. William M. McCulloch and Hon.
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.).
191. 114 CONG. REC. 2279 (1968) (statement of Sen. Edward W. Brooke).
192. Civil Rights: Hearing on S. 3296, supra note 188, at 68 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy)
(explaining that the fair housing bill "seeks as a matter of national policy to remove racial and religious
discrimination as a barrier to obtain housing").
193. H.R. REP. No. 89-1678, pt. 2, at 19 (statements of Hon. William M. McCulloch and Hon.
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.).
194. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearburn Park Ass'n., 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir.
2004).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000).
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of the Dirksen substitute amendment to H.R. 2516 in March of 1968.196 The
other fair housing bills considered by Congress in the preceding years con-
tained more detailed language, including specific references to use and oc-
cupancy of housing. For example, the 1966 fair housing legislation passed
by the House of Representatives explained that, "It is the policy of the
United States to prevent, and the right of every person to be protected
against, discrimination on account of race, color, religion, or national origin
in the purchase, rental, lease, financing, use and occupancy of housing
throughout the Nation."' 97 Similarly, in 1967, the Senate considered fair
housing legislation articulating the following policy: "[I]t is the policy of
the United States to prevent discrimination on account of race, color, relig-
ion, or national origin in the purchase, rental, financing, and occupancy of
housing throughout the Nation." 98
Should this shift in policy language be considered determinative? In
other words, because Congress deleted proposed statutory language explic-
itly including use and occupancy of housing within the ambit of the FHA,
should the statute now be read to exclude such protections? For at least two
reasons, modifications to the policy language considered and ultimately
passed by Congress do not appear to reflect any clear congressional position
on the FHA's post-acquisition reach. First, if we exclude "use and occu-
pancy" as categories of protection because those entitlements were deleted
from earlier proposed versions of the FHA, we should logically do the same
with the other entitlements deleted from fair housing bills between 1966 and
1968. In fact, all specific entitlements-including protection in the purchase
and leasing of dwellings-were deleted from earlier fair housing policy
statements when the Dirksen substitute was passed by Congress. 199 Reading
all of those specific guarantees out of the FHA would, of course, render the
statute meaningless. And no clear reason exists to treat use or occupancy
differently in this context than other protected areas, such as sales and
rental.2°
Second, if the deletion of specific references to use and occupancy pro-
tection in earlier fair housing policy statements signaled a revised scope for
the fair housing bill, Congress did not carry out such a revision by any
meaningful modification to the bill's substantive provisions. In fact, the
primary fair housing guarantees and prohibitions in §§ 3604 and 3617 were
196. 114 CONG. REc. 4975 (1968). The "fair housing" policy statement was contained in the
amended version of H.R. 2516 passed by the Senate on March 11, 1968. See 114 CONG. REc. 5992,
5995 (1968).
197. 112 CONG. REc. 18,739-40 (1966). The bill reported out by the House Judiciary Committee
declared that "it is the policy of the United States to prevent discrimination on account of race, color,
religion, or national origin in the purchase, rental, lease, financing, use, and occupancy of housing
throughout the Nation." H.R. REP. No. 89-1678, pt. 2, at 28 (1966) (emphasis added); 112 CONG. REC.
9396 (1966).
198. Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967, supra note 172, at 16 (emphasis added).
199. See 114 CONG. REC. 5992,5995 (1968).
200. A construction of the FHA that would render its provisions inoperative should be avoided under
basic concepts of statutory interpretation. See United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992).
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largely unchanged from the initial consideration in 1966 to the time the
FHA was signed into law by President Johnson in 1968.20 ' Because the
"teeth" of the FHA stayed constant during the time that the statute's policy
language was modified, the most reasonable conclusion to draw is that the
Dirksen substitute was seen by Congress as making only superficial changes
to the bill's policy statement. Indeed, there is no obvious textual reason to
read the FHA's broad guarantee of "fair housing" as extending only to
housing transactions and excluding occupancy.
4. Statements by Senator Mondale
In attempting to divine congressional intent, statements made by any
member of Congress during relevant debates might prove insightful;
20 2
however, the opinions of Senator Mondale appear to carry significant
weight. As discussed earlier, Senator Mondale was one of the cosponsors of
a 1968 Senate floor amendment to H.R. 2516, which inserted fair housing
language into the bill.203 Although the Mondale-Brooke amendment was
replaced by the Dirksen substitute,2° the substituted language was similar in
many respects to Senator Mondale's proposal.20 5 In addition, despite the
tabling of his proposed legislation, Senator Mondale remained a vocal pro-
ponent of federal fair housing guarantees and the FHA.2 °6
201. In the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1966 considered by the Senate, for example, Sections 403(a)
and (b) made it unlawful "[t]o refuse to sell, rent, or lease, refuse to negotiate for the sale, rental, or lease
of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling" and "[t]o discriminate against any person in the
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale, rental, or lease of a dwelling." See Civil Rights: Hearing on S.
3296, supra note 188, at 26. Section 405 of the same bill made it unlawful for any person to "intimidate,
threaten, coerce, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of... or on account of his
having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted by section
403 or 404." See id. Similar language was considered by Congress in 1967. See Proposed Civil Rights
Act of 1967, supra note 172, at 17. This early language is nearly identical to the substantive provisions of
the FHA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 & 3617 (2000).
202. Statements by individual legislators may provide evidence of congressional intent when consis-
tent with statutory language and other pieces of legislative history. See Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S.
253, 263 (1986) (citing Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 567 (1984)).
203. See supra notes 146-150 and accompanying text.
204. See 114 CONG. REC. 4570-73 (1968); Dubofsky, supra note 117, at 156-57. Because it was
introduced on the Senate floor, no Senate committee report exists considering the Dirksen substitute. See
Comment, supra note 117, at 750 n.86.
205. The language contained in Senate Bill 1358, which was introduced by Senators Mondale and
Brooke, is strikingly similar to the FHA in many substantive respects. For example, section 4(a) of
S.1358 makes it unlawful "[t]o refuse to sell or rent, to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin," and section 4(b) prohibited discrimination "in the terms, conditions or privileges of sale or
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith .... " See Title:
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 90th Cong. 442 (1967). This language is nearly identical to 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(b) (2000) of the
FHA. Similarly, section 7 of S.1358 is almost identical to the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2000). In constru-
ing legislative history, courts may give added weight to statements made by a bill's sponsor. See, e.g.,
Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581,598-99 (2004).
206. Particularly as passage of the FHA neared, Senator Mondale spoke frequently in support of fair
housing legislation from the Senate floor. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 4974-75, 5218-19, 6000-01 (1968)
(statements of Sen. Walter F. Mondale).
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On at least two occasions, one of which was cited by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Halprin,20 7 Senator Mondale made statements during congressional
consideration of the FHA that arguably sought to define the limits of the
statute rather than simply to provide examples of prohibited conduct. On
March 8, 1968, three days before the Senate voted to approve fair housing
legislation, Senators Mondale and Murphy discussed on the Senate floor the
meaning of the new policy language provided by the Dirksen substitute.2 °8
Under the Dirksen substitute, the stated policy of the bill was "to provide
for fair housing throughout the United States. ' '209 When questioned about
this policy by Senator Murphy, Senator Mondale explained, "Obviously,
this is to be read in context with the entire bill, the objective being to elimi-
nate discrimination in the sale or rental of housing .... It means the elimi-
nation of discrimination in the sale or rental of housing. That is all it could
possibly mean. 2 °10 At least one federal court has cited this statement by
Senator Mondale as support for the proposition, following Halprin, that the
FHA was intended to apply only to discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing.21 l
This reading, however, ignores the broader context of Senator Mon-
dale's statements. In particular, Senator Mondale's "all it could possibly
mean" comment responded to repeated inquiries from Senator Murphy re-
garding the precise meaning of the phrase "to provide for fair housing" in
the policy language of the Dirksen substitute.21 2 In this discussion, Senator
Murphy asked, "Is there not a possibility of misconception of what the word
'provide' means?... I would think there could be a great chance that the
word 'provide' [in the policy statement] could be read to mean almost any-
thing, including 'give.' 21 3 Apparently understanding Senator Murphy's
concern, Senator Mondale replied, "Not at all.... This is a declaration of
purpose. The phrase to be construed includes the words 'to provide for.' I
see no possibility of confusion on that point at all., 214 Pushing the issue,
Senator Murphy continued: "If the Senator will forgive me, it says 'provide
fair housing.' 215 Does that mean to give the housing, to make it avail-
207. See Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th
Cir. 2004).
208. See 114 CONG. REC. 4975 (1968).
209. Id. at 4975. In response to a request from Senator Murphy, Senator Mondale read the Dirksen
substitute's policy language into the record. See id.
210. See id. at 4975 (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale).
211. Cox v. City of Dallas, No. Civ. A. 398CVI 763BH, 2004 WL 370242, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 24,
2004). According to the district court, Senator Mondale's "all it could possibly mean" comment fully
supported decisions by other courts refusing to apply the FHA post-acquisition. See id.
212. See 114 CONG. REC. 4975 (1968).
213. Id. (statement of Sen. George Murphy).
214. Id. (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale).
215. Senator Murphy was wrong on this point. Neither the Dirksen substitute nor the FHA signed
into law by President Johnson articulated a policy to "provide fair housing." Both the Dirksen substitute
and the enacted FHA stated that it is the policy of the United States to provide for fair housing. See 42
U.S.C. § 3601 (2000); 114 CONG. REc. 4975 (1968).
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able? ' 2 16 Clearly tiring of Senator Murphy's questioning, Senator Mondale
ended the conversation: "Without doubt, it means to provide for what is
provided in the bill. It means the elimination of discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing. That is all it could possibly mean. '217 In light of the full
colloquy, it is apparent that Senator Mondale was responding to a narrow
question-whether the policy statement contained in the Dirksen substitute
was intended to and could reasonably be construed as requiring that housing
be provided or given to protected persons. Given the full context of Senator
Mondale's comments, it is clear that his "all it could possibly mean" state-
ment has no bearing on whether the FHA should be read to include post-
218acquisition claims.
One week later on the Senate floor, Senator Mondale discussed cover-
age of the Dirksen substitute: "The coverage of the fair housing provisions
is far greater than we had anticipated, but I must warn that this bill is only a
foot in the door .... It puts only a negative restriction on the sale and rental
of housing. '219 Although the Halprin court cites to a partial reprint of this
discussion to support its reading of the FHA's legislative history,22° the full
context of Senator Mondale's statement makes clear that he was not ad-
dressing the possible post-acquisition scope of the FHA.221 Instead, Senator
Mondale was addressing the concern voiced repeatedly by opponents of fair
housing legislation: that the bill would require or force housing sales or
rentals to minorities.22 Immediately after stating that the legislation "puts
only a negative restriction" on sales and rentals, Senator Mondale explained
his comment: "A person is left with all of his rights to sell to whomever he
pleases ... but there is one thing he cannot do: he cannot if he uses a real
estate broker refuse on the grounds of race to sell to a Negro buyer. ' 223 Two
sentences earlier, Senator Mondale explained that although the housing bill
provided a "negative restriction" against discrimination, "[i]t does nothing
affirmative to relieve the immense problems our Nation faces. 224 In other
216. 114 CONG. REC. 4975 (1968) (statement of Sen. George Murphy).
217. Id.
218. See supra notes 207-217 and accompanying text.
219. 114 CONG. REC. 6000 (1968).
220. See Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th
Cir. 2004) (citing SCHWARTZ, supra note 165, at 1709-17, 1742-51, 1762, 1769). The full text of Senator
Mondale's comments following Senate passage of the Dirksen substitute are found at 114 CONG. REC.
6000(1968).
221. See 114 CONG. REC. 6000 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale).
222. Id. One criticism of fair housing legislation raised throughout its consideration was that the
statute would force homeowners to sell or rent to minorities. See, e.g., Civil Rights: Hearing on S. 3296,
supra note 188, at 60-65 (statement of Sen. Samuel Ervin) (contending that "forced housing" legislation
"would deprive the American people of their right to sell, lease, or rent their property to whom they
choose"); Civil Rights and Housing, supra note 146, at 6 (statement of Att'y Gen. Ramsey Clark)
("'here is nothing in this bill to prevent personal choice where personal choice, not discrimination, is the
real reason for action."); H.R. REP. No. 89-1678, pt. 2, at 54, 57-58 (1966) (statement of Rep. Basil L.
Whitener) (arguing, in part, that if fair housing legislation were passed, "precious rights of all of us
would be lost").
223. 114 CONG. REc. 6000 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale). Failure to employ a broker
alone does not exempt a housing transaction from FHA coverage. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (2000).
224. 114 CONG. REC. 6000 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale).
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words, the fair housing bill encompassed discrimination in refusals to sell or
rent, but it did not guarantee housing for any protected group by, for exam-
ple, forcing homeowners into compulsory sales.225 Once again, when seen
in context, Senator Mondale's statement does not help clarify whether Con-
gress intended to exclude post-acquisition claims from the FHA.
5. Constitutional Bases for the FHA
Throughout congressional debate over the FHA, the legislation's consti-
tutionality was the subject of discussion.226 Proponents of the measure saw
two constitutional bases to support fair housing legislation. As explained by
Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach after introduction of the Johnson
administration's fair housing proposal in 1966, "Title IV [the fair housing
title] is based primarily on the commerce clause of the Constitution and on
the 14th amendment., 227 Subsequent debates in 1967 and 1968 made clear
that housing advocates saw those two constitutional provisions as support-
ing the proposed legislation.228
In testimony from 1966, Attorney General Katzenbach argued that "in-
terstate commerce is significantly affected by the sale even of single dwell-
ings, multiplied many times in each community. '229 Given the interstate
nature of the housing design, financing, and construction industries, he con-
cluded that "anything which significantly affects the housing industry also
affects interstate commerce.,, 230 Because "[d]iscriminatory housing prac-
tices" restrict the amount and type of new housing, discourage maintenance
of existing housing, and frustrate relocation efforts, such practices directly
affect interstate commerce and are proper subjects for federal legislation.231
Attorney General Ramsey Clark took this argument one step further in 1967
by explaining that the plenary power of Congress to protect interstate com-
merce "extends to all activities which affect interstate commerce, even if the
225. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603.
226. See, e.g., Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967, supra note 172, at 480-81 (statement of Sen. Philip
Hart); Civil Rights and Housing, supra note 146, at 6-14; H.R. REP. No. 89-1678, pt. 2, at 12 (statement
of Rep. Emanuel Celler).
227. Miscellaneous Proposals, supra note 139, at 1070 (statement of Att'y Gen. Nicholas deB.
Katzenbach); see also H.R. REP. No. 89-1678, pt. 2, at 12 (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler) ("The
power of Congress to prohibit discrimination in commercial housing transactions by persons engaged in
the housing business is supported by two independent constitutional grounds: the commerce clause...
and the enforcement clause of the 14th amendment .... ).
228. See, e.g., Civil Rights and Housing, supra note 146, at 6-14 (statement of Att'y Gen. Ramsey
Clark) ("This measure seeks to proceed not on the ground of one constitutional section alone but both,
the commerce clause and the 14th amendment.").
229. Miscellaneous Proposals, supra note 139, at 1070-71 (statement of Att'y Gen. Nicholas deB.
Katzenbach). As explained by Attorney General Katzenbach, it would not be unusual for a real estate
developer from California to plan a subdivision in Arizona using banks in New York, pension funds in
Chicago, contractors from Texas, lumber from Oregon, and steel products from Pennsylvania. In this
scenario, "the 'housing' as a marketable commodity, was created, financed, and sold in and through the
channels of interstate commerce." Id. at 1071.




goods or persons engaged in the activities are not then, or may never be,
traveling in commerce. '232 That position was supported by others who
spoke in favor of fair housing, including the deans of several law schools
who provided testimony on legal aspects of the proposed legislation.
233
If the FHA was never intended to cover post-acquisition disputes, then
the law applies only to commercial housing transactions and related ser-
vices, such as financing.234 If the FHA was solely transaction-focused, how-
ever, the Commerce Clause would provide adequate constitutional support
for the proposed legislation.235 In other words, it would not be necessary to
articulate a Fourteenth Amendment constitutional basis for the new fair
housing law. However, if the FHA's coverage extended beyond the com-
mercial transaction into occupancy, the Commerce Clause might not pro-
vide adequate constitutional support. For the FHA to constitutionally apply
to such post-acquisition claims, fair housing proponents might need an al-
ternative constitutional basis-which the Fourteenth Amendment provides.
Accordingly, it could be argued that the identification of two constitutional
bases for the FHA demonstrates that members of Congress understood the
FHA to include both a transaction component, supported by the Commerce
Clause, and a post-acquisition component, supported by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
If this motivation for relying on the Fourteenth Amendment did exist
for members of Congress, however, it is not clearly reflected in the legisla-
tive debates.236 In discussing the Fourteenth Amendment-in particular,
Section Five, or the Enforcement Clause237-Reverend Robert Drinan, Dean
of Boston College Law School, explained to Congress that the provision "is
a positive grant of legislative power" authorizing passage of all legislation
232. Civil Rights and Housing, supra note 146, at 14 (statement of Att'y Gen. Ramsey Clark).
233. See, e.g., id. at 129 (statement of Reverend Robert F. Drinan, Dean, Boston College Law
School) (arguing that Congress has the constitutional power "to enact legislation to curb bias" under the
commerce clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the Commerce Clause justifies "[f]ederal
action even if there is a very slight impact on interstate commerce of the regulated activities"); see also
id. at 256 (Memorandum of Law on the Constitutionality of Federal Fair Housing Legislation, submitted
by Edward Rutledge, Executive Director, National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing) ("It is
also well settled that the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause extends to activities which are
ordinarily considered local and which seem to have at most a very slight impact on interstate com-
merce.").
234. The Seventh Circuit made clear in Halprin that the focus of the FHA was on the problematic
exclusion of minorities from housing opportunities, not how they might be treated once they moved into
majority-occupied neighborhoods. See Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n,
388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004).
235. The adequacy of the Commerce Clause as constitutional support for a transaction-only reading
of the FHA is further supported by the Supreme Court's decision-handed down twenty-six years before
passage of the FHA-that the Commerce Clause is triggered even where the activity is intrastate but
exerts an economic effect on interstate commerce. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123-25 (1942).
236. See 114 CONG. REC. 6000 (1968).
237. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see Civil Rights and Housing, supra note 146, at 260 (Memoran-
dum of Law on the Constitutionality of Federal Fair Housing Legislation, submitted by Edward
Rutledge, Executive Director, National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing).
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needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.238 In his
opinion, Section Five was intended as a "mandate to Congress to end ine-
quality and all of the badges and indicia of slavery. '23 9 When applied to the
housing context, Reverend Drinan believed that Section Five would author-
ize passage of a law that "would bring to the Nation a nationally guaranteed
right to purchase or rent a home regardless of one's race."
240
Jefferson Fordham, Dean of the University of Pennsylvania School of
Law, identified a broader purpose underlying the FHA, also supported by
the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24' According to
Dean Fordham, the Enforcement Clause enables Congress to use any ra-
tional means to effectuate equal protection, even where the means are "not
confined to regulation of activities violative of the prohibition, but extend[]
to a regulation of other activities if that regulation is a rational means of
effectuating the prohibition., 242 Although Dean Fordham did specifically
identify private decisions to discriminate in housing as an "obstacle ... to
the practical enjoyment of civil rights,' 243 his focus was broader. Dean
Fordham discussed the "great urban crisis" of de facto segregation, which
"calls for comprehensive programs of immense proportions." 244 Such segre-
gation, he argued, led to other societal ills, including restricted opportunities
in education and employment-problems that "cannot be dealt with effec-
tively in isolation. 245 In this context, Dean Fordham spoke of a need to
ensure "formal freedom to acquire and use housing" and the importance of
protecting the "freedom to acquire and enjoy" property.246 In testimony the
previous year, Attorney General Katzenbach expressed a similar belief: "To
me it is clear that the 14th amendment gives Congress the power to address
itself to the vindication of what is, in substance, the freedom to live. 247
In short, articulation of a Fourteenth Amendment constitutional basis
for the FHA suggests, but does not prove, an intended scope of the Act be-
yond guaranteeing a nondiscriminatory housing transaction-which would
238. Civil Rights and Housing, supra note 146, at 131 (statement of Reverend Robert F. Drinan,
Dean, Boston College Law School).
239. Id. at 132.
240. Id. (emphasis added).
241. Id. at 133 (statement of Jefferson Fordham, Dean, University of Pennsylvania Law School).
242. Id.
243. Id.; see also id. ("[eiquality of opportunity as to housing is of the highest order of importance";
"[tlhe familiar insistence that an owner should be protected in a freedom to dispose of his property as he
pleases, especially his residence, is not compelling"; "a broad openhousing policy that is given vitality in
practice is essential to the effective relief of slum conditions").
244. Id.; see also Miscellaneous Proposals, supra note 139, at 1070 (statement of Att'y Gen. Nicho-
las deB. Katzenbach) (discussing Fourteenth Amendment support for the elimination of segregated
living through enactment of the FHA).
245. Civil Rights and Housing, supra note 146, at 133 (statement of Jefferson Fordham, Dean, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School).
246. Id. (emphasis added).
247. Miscellaneous Proposals, supra note 139, at 1070 (statement of Att'y Gen. Nicholas deB.
Katzenbach). Attorney General Katzenbach clearly saw the broader implications of the FHA: "To the
extent that [segregated living] impedes States and localities from carrying out their obligations under the
14th amendment to promote equal access and equal opportunity in all public aspects of community life,
the 14th amendment authorizes removal of this impediment." Id.
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have been adequately supported by the Commerce Clause alone. Testimony
regarding the Act's constitutionality clearly reflects a desire to broadly at-
tack both actual denials of housing and the problems flowing from racial
segregation. As discussed earlier, that same concern surfaced throughout
congressional consideration of the FHA248 and is consistent with a desire to
prohibit post-acquisition harassment.
6. Relevance of Title V/ § 3631
Another insight into the intended scope of the FHA may be gleaned
from congressional debate and discussion regarding Title IX of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968. As discussed earlier,249 Title IX, which is codified at 42
U.S.C. § 3631, provides criminal sanctions for the use of force or threats of
force to injure, intimidate, or interfere with persons who sell, purchase, rent,
finance, or occupy housing.25 0 Unlike §§ 3601-3619, which address housing
rights from a civil perspective, § 3631 explicitly extends federal criminal
protection to persons who suffer unlawful discrimination or harassment
while they either occupy housing or are contracting to occupy housing.25'
Section 3631 developed out of what was originally designated Title V
of the draft civil rights bills considered by Congress from 1966 to 1968.252
Title V, labeled "Interference with Rights," sought to criminalize interfer-
ence with a person "because of his present or past participation in" various
253enumerated activities. From the activities listed in the draft bills, Title V
was intended to have a broad scope, covering both predicate acts (e.g.,
"qualifying to vote," "enrolling in" schools, "applying for.., employment,"
attending court in connection with possible jury service, and acquiring hous-
ing) and the more substantive resulting activities (e.g., "voting," "attending"
schools, "enjoying employment," "serving... as a grand or petit juror," and
"occupying... any dwelling").254 Title V of the draft civil rights bills even-
tually split into two separate provisions late in the process of enacting the
Civil Rights Act of 1968.255 Title I of the new law, captioned "Interference
with Federally Protected Activities," criminalizes unlawful interference in
various non-housing contexts, including voting, federal employment, public
education, jury service, federal assistance, travel in interstate commerce,
and public accommodation.256 Title IX of the Act, or § 3631, applies solely
248. See supra pp. 225-29.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 117-120.
250. See 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (2000).
251. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 3631.
252. See, e.g., Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967, supra note 172, at 42-43.
253. See, e.g., id.
254. See, e.g., id.
255. Id. at 48 (original version of the bill without fair housing provisions); id. at 50 (companion bill
adding the fair housing provision); 114 CONG. REc. 5807, 5812-14, 5819-22, 5840-45 (1968) (Senate
debate on March 4 and March 8, 1968, amending H.R. 2516 and moving the fair housing provisions).
256. Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2000).
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to housing.257 Like earlier drafts of Title V, § 3631 explicitly prohibits
unlawful actions occurring before or during the real estate transaction ("be-
cause [the person] is... selling, purchasing, renting, financing '' 258) and af-
terward ("because [the person] is ... occupying" 259). Very little legislative
history exists that specifically relates to § 3631. Instead, because § 3631 has
its origins in Title V of the draft civil rights bills and was separated out only
at a very late stage, congressional debates over draft Title V are instructive
when attempting to construe the meaning and intended impact of § 3631.260
For the purposes of evaluating the post-acquisition scope of the FHA,
an important point discussed repeatedly during congressional debates was
that the criminal protections provided by Title V were seen to complement
existing civil protections for the same enumerated rights. As explained by
Senator Hart in 1967, "In passing title V, the Congress would be acting to
protect rights that it has, either through constitutional amendment or statu-
tory enactment, declared to be the citizen's due., 26 1 This is consistent with
the House Judiciary Committee Report accompanying H.R. 14765 in 1966,
which explained that Title V was "designed to deter and punish interference
by force or threat of force with activities protected by Federal law or the
Constitution. 262 Title V was intended to provide criminal sanctions against
unlawful interference,263 targeting not only protected activities but also "in-
terference that occurs either before or after a person engages in protected
conduct but which is related to that conduct.,, 264 Under Title V, the victim
"need not himself have had anything to do with any kind of civil rights ac-
tivity," as long as the attack was "for the purpose of discouraging [protected
257. 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (2000).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. The Supreme Court considers the legislative history of an unenacted bill "wholly relevant to an
understanding of' a subsequently enacted statute containing the same operative language. United States
v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 404 n.14 (1973); see also Huffman v. Office of Pets. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341,
1347 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
261. Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967, supra note 172, at 481 (statement of Sen. Philip A. Hart); see
also Miscellaneous Proposals, supra note 139, at 1073 (statement of Att'y Gen. Nicholas deB. Katzen-
bach) (explaining that Title V "would make it a crime for private individuals forcibly to interfere, di-
rectly or indirectly, with participation in activities protected by Federal laws," and explaining the provi-
sion "prohibits injury, intimidation of interference based on race, color, religion, or national origin that
occurs while the victim is actually engaging in protected activity"); H.R. REP. No. 89-1678, pt. 2, at 23
(1966) (statements of Reps. Richard H. Poff & William C. Cramer) ("Force or threat of force on account
of race or color against those lawfully engaged in activities protected by Federal law is defined as a
Federal crime.").
262. H.R. REP. No. 89-1678, pt. 2, at 31. But see id. at 14-15 (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler).
Rep. Celler expressed his view that Title V "is not limited to the scope of the 'rights' created by other
Federal laws outlawing discrimination with respect to those activities," explaining that, for example,
Title V would cover employers who, because of their small size, would be exempt from civil restrictions
on discrimination. Id. According to Rep. Celler, the Constitution empowered Congress to "regulate[]
intrastate commerce in order to insure the effective regulation of interstate commerce." Id.
263. The Johnson Administration, at the very least, saw Title V as covering both actual and threat-
ened physical damage to property, such as the threat to bum down one's house. See Miscellaneous
Proposals, supra note 139, at 1238 (statement of Att'y Gen. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach).
264. Id. at 1076.
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persons] generally from engaging in activities" specifically listed in Title V
and protected by federal law.265
If, as the legislative history reflects, Title V serves as the criminal law
counterpart to existing civil protections for the enumerated activities, the
only logical conclusion is that existing federal civil law was believed to
protect, at least in some circumstances, the occupation of property. No fed-
eral law existing prior to 1968 could reasonably be cited as protecting such
occupation of property. The most likely federal candidate possibly would
have been 42 U.S.C. § 1982, passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
which guaranteed, in part, the right to "inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property. 266 However, it was only in June of
1968-after the FHA was signed into law in April of 1968-that § 1982
was held for the first time by the U.S. Supreme Court to apply to all public
26
and private real estate transactions. 267 With § 1982 ruled out, only the FHA
remains as a reasonable source of federal law protecting a general right to
occupy housing. Although the congressional statements cited above seem to
suggest that the civil law parallels to § 3631 were already in existence in
1968, contemporaneous passage of the FHA and § 3631 would reach the
same result: when § 3631 was finally enacted into law, it codified criminal
prohibitions that tracked civil guarantees, including the right to occupy
housing, enacted under the FHA at the same time.
In summary, a fair reading of the FHA's voluminous legislative history
does not unequivocally resolve whether Congress understood the statute to
apply to post-acquisition harassment claims. The congressional record re-
flects a recurring recognition of a national, multifaceted racial problem
gripping the country in the 1960s, with its core centered on the issue of
housing. Guaranteeing nondiscriminatory access was certainly a fundamen-
tal part of the solution, but discussions about fair housing legislation never
limited the law's scope to access. In fact, recognizing some level of occu-
pancy protection is consistent with a number of aspects of the FHA's legis-
lative history, such as the expression of a Fourteenth Amendment basis for
the law and the creation of parallel criminal protection for occupancy. How-
ever, because no definitive statement or testimony compels the conclusion
that occupancy protection was intended by Congress, the FHA's legislative
history is of limited usefulness in clearly demarcating the statute's bounda-
ries.
265. Id. at 1074.
266. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000) (emphasis added).
267. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
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C. Analogy to Title VII
Where the text and legislative history of the FHA leave questions about
the statute's contours, federal courts have relied on Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 for guidance. To a significant extent, this reliance is
based on the U.S. Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Trafficante v. Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co.,268 in which the Court construed FHA standing
using an analogy to Title VII. 269 In particular, the Court cited approvingly a
federal decision that identified "a congressional intention to define [Title
VII] standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitu-
tion. 270 In the context of standing under the FHA, the Court "reach[ed] the
same conclusion., 271 The Supreme Court's reliance on Title VII case law to
interpret the scope of the FHA paved the way for lower federal courts to
invoke Title VII when faced with various FHA questions, including whether
to recognize discriminatory effects,272 how to approach mixed motive
cases, 273 and when burden shifting should be implemented in the process of
evaluating discriminatory intent,274 among others.275
Analogy to Title VII has specifically played a key role in developing
post-acquisition harassment law under the FHA. In Shellhammer v. Le-
wallen, an Ohio district court became one of the first district courts to apply
in the housing context the hostile environment cause of action drawn from
employment litigation.276 Since that time, numerous courts have evaluated
post-acquisition harassment claims in housing disputes by referencing, if
not heavily relying on, case law involving on-the-job harassment of em-
277ployees. This reliance often occurs after a court makes two related find-
268. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
269. Id. at 209.
270. Id. (quoting Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc. 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
271. Id.
272. See, e.g., Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Resident Advisory
Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146-47 (3d Cir. 1977); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1289-90 (7th Cir. 1977).
273. See, e.g., Bachman v. St. Monica's Congregation, 902 F.2d 1259, 1262-63 (7th Cir. 1990); Cato
v. Jilek, 779 F. Supp. 937, 943-44 (N.D. 111. 1991); Aloqaili v. Nat'l Hous. Corp., 743 F. Supp. 1264,
1270-71 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
274. See, e.g., Reg'l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 48-52
(2d Cir. 2002); Allen v. Muriello, 217 F.3d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 2000); Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev. v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 870-72 (11 th Cir. 1990).
275. See, e.g., Pinchback v. Armistead Homes Corp., 907 F.2d 1447, 1451-52 (4th Cir. 1990) (rely-
ing on "futile gesture" law under Title VII in denial of housing case); Huntington Branch, NAACP v.
Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding "the disparate impact approach of Title
VII cases is fully applicable to this Title VIII case"); Hall v. Lowder Realty Co., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1299,
1313 (M.D. Ala. 2001) ("In both FHA and section 1981 cases, courts apply the methods of analysis
developed for use in cases under Title VII ... ").
276. No. C. 82-689, 1 Fair Hous. Fair Lend. (P-H) 15,472 (W.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 1983), afftd, No.
84-3573, 1985 WL 13505 (6th Cir. July 31, 1985); see DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th
Cir. 1996) (recognizing the Shellhammer decision as the first district court to so rule); Beliveau v. Caras,
873 F. Supp. 1393, 1396 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (same).
277. See, e.g., Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 2003); DiCenso, 96 F.3d at
1008; Honce v. Vigil, I F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993); Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condo. Unit Owners
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ings: first, that post-hiring harassment is considered to be actionable under
Title VI, 27 8 and second, that striking similarities exist between Title VII
and the FHA in terms of design, scope, and purpose.279 As one court de-
scribed these similarities, because Title VII and the FHA "share the same
purpose-to end bias and prejudice-[post-acquisition] harassment should
be actionable under [the FHA]."280
Despite the tendency of most federal courts to analogize from Title VII
to the FHA, the Seventh Circuit in Halprin recognized the potential discon-
nect in that analogy, at least in the context of post-acquisition harassment
claims. 281 The court noted that in several instances, the FHA has been seen
to encompass certain post-acquisition harassment claims "by analogy to
'constructive discharge,' a form of discrimination recognized in Title VII
cases."28 2 The Seventh Circuit observed that Title VII "protects the job
holder as well as the job applicant," extending the statute's reach beyond the
time of hiring. 283 As a result, when an employer's harassment forces an
employee to quit her job, the employer "is engaged in job discrimination
within the meaning of [Title VII]. ',284 However, the court refused to draw
any parallel to the FHA in this context. 285 In particular, the Halprin court
opined that courts relying on an analogy to Title VII to support a post-
acquisition dimension to the FHA did not "consider the difference in lan-
guage between the two statutes. 286
A careful evaluation of Title VII's text, however, does appear generally
to support the analogy drawn by most federal courts in this area. One impor-
tant and ironic similarity between the two statutes is that neither expressly
speaks to post-transaction harassment 287-neither even mentions the word
Ass'n, No. CIV. A. 96-2495RMU, 1997 WL 1877201, at *6 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1997); Williams v. Poret-
sky Mgmt., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 490, 494-95 (D. Md. 1996); Beliveau, 873 F. Supp. at 1396-97; New York
v. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. 1101, 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). But see Lawrence v. Courtyards at Deerwood
Ass'n, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1148-49 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (rejecting hostile racial housing environ-
ment claim and related analogy to Title VII).
278. See, e.g., Reeves, 1997 WL 1877201, at *6; Williams, 955 F. Supp. at 494-95; see also Neu-
decker, 351 F.3d at 364 (making the same point in the disability context by analogy to the Rehabilitation
Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act).
279. The Second Circuit in Huntington Branch, NAACP, for example, described the "persuasive...
parallel between Title VII and Title VIII' making the two statutes "part of a coordinated scheme of
federal civil rights laws enacted to end discrimination." 844 F.2d at 934.
280. Williams, 955 F. Supp. at 495. As the district court in Beliveau explained, "[Ilt is beyond ques-
tion that sexual harassment is a form of discrimination ... [and] the purposes underlying Titles VII and
VIII are sufficiently similar so as to support discrimination claims based on sexual harassment regardless
of context." 873 F. Supp. at 1397; see also Reeves, 1997 WL 1877201, at *6. The frequent third step in
this process is to recognize that other courts have recognized harassment claims under the FHA. See,
e.g., Williams, 955 F. Supp. at 495.







287. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-15 (2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000); Shellhammer v.
Lewallen, No. C. 82-689, 1 Fair Hous. Fair Lend. (P-H) 15,472 (W.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 1983) (noting
20061
Alabama Law Review
"harassment."2 88 Instead, each statute has at its substantive core the guaran-
tee of access-to employment, in the context of Title VII, and in the FHA,
to housing. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual . . . because of' the individual's pro-
tected status. 89 Similarly, the FHA deems it unlawful for any person "[t]o
refuse to sell or rent ... or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of'
the person's protected status. 290 This statutory focus on ensuring access is
evidenced throughout both Title VII and the FHA. 91
Despite the textual focus of Title VII on ensuring access, the statute has
been interpreted as providing federal protection for harassment claims that
arise post-hiring. 92 As explained by one commentator, in the context of
Title VII, it is the "universal rule now . . . that [unlawful] harassment on the
job is employment discrimination within the meaning of Title VII. ' 29 3 A
considerable body of federal case law, including decisions by the U.S. Su-
preme Court, supports this position, recognizing that Title VII's prohibition
against discrimination encompasses harassment suffered post-hiring. 94
In reaching that conclusion in the employment context, courts have in-
terpreted Title VII's prohibition against discriminatory "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) as "an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit
the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic
or racial [or sexual] discrimination. 295 Importantly, the FHA contains
phrasing that is nearly identical in relevant part.296 Section 3604(b) of the
FHA prohibits unlawful discrimination "in the terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facili-
that although "[slexual harassment is not specifically addressed in either Title VII or its legislative
history[,] ... courts have had little difficulty in interpreting and applying Title VI to claims of such
harassment"), aft'd, No. 84-3573, 1985 WL 13505 (6th Cir. July 31, 1985).
288. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-15; 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631.
289. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
290. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
291. For a discussion of the FHA's textual focus on access, see supra Part III.A. and accompanying
notes. Title VII contains numerous statutory references reflecting a concern with access as well. For
example, Title VII refers repeatedly to "applicants for employment," "fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire and
employ," "reinstatement or hiring of employees," and "refus[ing] to refer for employment." See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2), -2(g), -5(g)(1), -2(b).
292. See Shellhammer, Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rep., 15,472, at 135.
293. See id. (quoting 1 LEx K. LARSEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 8-99 (1975)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
294. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (recognizing that
Title VII prohibits same-sex harassment post-hiring); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
64 (1986) (noting that "[w]ithout question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of
the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex"); see also Katz v. Dole, 709
F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson,
641 F.2d 934,944 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Zabkowicz v. W. Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
295. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
296. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2000).
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ties in connection therewith., 297 Several courts interpreting this language in
the housing context have found it, like in the parallel employment setting, to
298erlcutiNwcover harassment suffered post-transaction. As one federal court in New
York explained, "Sexual harassment constitutes discrimination in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling on the basis of sex., 29 9 From
the face of virtually identical statutory language, it is difficult to justify a
post-hiring dimension to Title VII while also rejecting a post-acquisition
scope for the FHA.
Beyond their failure to explicitly address "harassment" and their use of
nearly identical "terms, conditions, or privileges" 3°° language, Title VII and
the FHA are structurally similar-each is a broad civil rights statute-which
lends further credit to analogies drawn between them. For example, both
statutes expressly extend to retaliation against persons who have sought
protection under the federal laws; 30 1 prohibit the printing and publishing of
discriminatory advertisements; 3°2 establish federal agency oversight over
and administration of their respective substantive areas, including how the
agencies will receive, evaluate, and respond to alleged statutory violations
and how they will undertake conciliation and education activities;303 outline
the situations in which private suits may be brought to enforce statutory
protections; 304 and specify the circumstances in which either the administra-
tive agency and/or the U.S. Attorney's office may institute proceedings un-
der the statutes.30 5 In terms of both general areas of coverage and specific
statutory language applicable to harassment claims, Title VII and the FHA
share many similarities.30 6
Nevertheless, textual differences do exist between the two statutes.3°
Most importantly for this analysis, Title VII arguably contains language
more clearly and more frequently indicating post-transaction coverage than
does the FHA. For example, Title VII prohibits an employer from improp-
erly segregating its "employees or applicants for employment., 30 8 Similarly,
labor organizations may not improperly limit their "membership or appli-
cants for membership," including in ways that would affect an employee's
"status as an employee or as an applicant for employment. ''3°9 Title VII also
297. Id.
298. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
299. Rich v. Lubin, No. 02 Civ. 6786(TPG), 2004 WL 1124662, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2004).
300. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
301. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2000).
302. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b); FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
303. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 to e-5; FHA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608-3609.
304. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f); FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3613.
305. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 to e-6; FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3610-12, 3614.
306. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (prohibiting discrimination based on an individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin), with 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (prohibiting discrimination based on a
person's race, color, religion, sex, familial status, and national origin).
307. See Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir.
2004).
308. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (emphasis added); see also id. § 2000e-3(a).
309. Id. § 2000e-2(c)(2) (emphasis added).
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allows employers to utilize a bona fide seniority or merit system that can
result in different levels of compensation or privileges of employment. 310 In
addition, the statute prohibits employers from adjusting the scores of, or
applying different cutoff scores for, "applicants or candidates for employ-
ment or promotion" based on improper criteria.31 Title VII also stipulates
that one way to determine when charges of an "unlawful employment prac-
tice" must be filed will hinge on "when a person aggrieved is injured by the
application of the seniority system.,
312
The language chosen by Congress in Title VII appears clearly to protect
both applicants for employment and current employees, providing unques-
tionable post-hiring coverage under Title VII. However, contrary to the
Halprin court's suggestion, Title VII's clear post-hiring scope strengthens,
rather than weakens, the analogy to the FHA. As discussed above in Part
III.A., the FHA also contains various textual indications of a desire by Con-
33gress that the statute apply post-acquisition. t3 Such intent is especially ap-
parent in the case of § 3617, whose text most clearly supports a claim of
post-acquisition harassment under the FHA.314 Furthermore, federal courts
are expected to broadly construe the FHA's language-like that of Title
VII-given the expansive remedial purposes underlying the statute.31 5
Overall, the textual and underlying similarities between Title VII and the
FHA appear compelling. While there are certainly differences between the
two statutes, none of those differences meaningfully undercuts the post-
acquisition analogy that has been drawn between the statutes by most
courts.
D. Policy Considerations in Support of FHA Harassment Coverage
The analyses in the preceding parts suggest that courts recognizing post-
acquisition harassment protection under the FHA are on solid legal ground.
The text of the FHA clearly speaks to issues beyond simple access to hous-
ing, including providing protection from intimidation, coercion, and
threats.316 Although the statute's legislative history does not definitively
310. See id. § 2000e-2(h).
311. Id. § 2000e-2(/) (emphasis added).
312. See id. § 2000e-5(e)(2).
313. See discussion supra Part III.A.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 107-116.
315. Courts have routinely recognized that the FHA should be broadly construed. See, e.g., Traffi-
cante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (explaining that the "language of the Act is broad
and inclusive"); Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (Wright, J., concurring)
(concluding that its interpretation of § 3604(c) would be broad, consistent with the "well established"
practice "that civil rights statutes should be read expansively in order to fulfill their purpose"); see also
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 (1977) (observing that "Congress has
made a strong national commitment to promot[ing] integrated housing"). Similarly, courts have broadly
construed Title VII. See Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that "it has been
long established that Title VII, as remedial legislation, is construed broadly"); Jones v. Flagship Int'l,
793 F.2d 714, 726 (5th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that the provisions of Title VII "must be construed
broadly in order to give effect to Congress' intent in eliminating invidious employment practices").
316. See 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
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prove that protecting occupancy was at the forefront of legislators' minds,
the record does reflect a consistently repeated concern with guaranteeing
broad housing rights.317 Congress was concerned not with mere access to
housing but with facilitating integration and eliminating the wide-ranging
employment, social, and economic effects flowing from segregated living
patterns. Protecting minority occupation of housing is fully consistent with
congressional motivations underlying the FHA. Furthermore, nowhere in
the FHA's legislative history is harassment protection explicitly excluded
from coverage. Adding to the statute's text and legislative history is a com-
pelling analogy to Title VII, under which post-hiring harassment is action-
able. Similarities in the statutes' substantive provisions and broad, remedial
scope further support the recognition of a parallel claim in the housing con-
text.
Beyond the legal analysis of whether the FHA can be read to include
post-acquisition harassment protection is the question of whether policy
considerations suggest that it should be read so broadly. Although a thor-
ough analysis of relevant policy in this area is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, this Part briefly addresses two policies that weigh in favor of a broad
reading. The first Subpart asks whether recognizing post-acquisition har-
assment coverage necessarily and improperly draws federal courts into eve-
ryday disputes between neighbors. The second Subpart briefly considers the
role that harassment has played in the creation and maintenance of de facto
residential segregation.
1. Policing Neighborhood Quarrels
Several courts have expressed a concern that extending the scope of the
FHA beyond the initial acquisition of housing would result in federal over-
sight of common, ordinary neighbor-to-neighbor disagreements. At the most
extreme end, this concern provided the Seventh Circuit in Halprin further
justification for its restrictive reading of the FHA. According to that court,
effectively policing how minority groups are treated once they finally gain
access to "desirable residential areas ... would have required careful draft-
ing in order to make sure that quarrels between neighbors did not become a
routine basis for federal litigation. 31 8 The court appears to conclude that
without such careful drafting, the danger of reviewing simple neighborhood
disputes is simply too great; as a result, the FHA's text should be narrowly
read to exclude all such disputes.
In fact, a number of courts, regardless of whether they ultimately recog-
nize a post-acquisition dimension to the FHA, have been troubled by this
same line drawing dilemma.319 In United States v. Altmayer, for example,
317. See discussion supra Part RLI.B.
318. See Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th
Cir. 2004).
319. See, e.g., Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 2005); Silcox v. Flagship Mgmt.,
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the district court explained, "[W]e do not want, and we do not think Con-
gress wanted, to convert every quarrel among neighbors in which a racial or
religious slur is hurled into a federal case. 32° In the words of another dis-
trict court, the FHA does not "impose a code of civility" on neighbors, nor
does it "require that neighbors smile, say hello or hold the door for each
other. 3 21 To allow all manner of neighborhood disputes to be actionable
under the FHA, in the court's view, "would have the effect of demeaning
the aims of the [statute] and the legitimate claims of plaintiffs who have
been subjected to invidious and hurtful discrimination and retaliation in the
housing market., 322 Although distinguishing between viable housing har-
assment claims and those that should be dismissed may be challenging in
some cases, any significant concern about the ability of courts to actually
draw such lines is overblown.
The FHA clearly is not a model of textual clarity323 and could include
more detailed factors to screen harassment claims; however, its operative
provisions provide courts adequate guidance to determine which post-
acquisition harassment claims may be brought. For example, § 3617's pro-
hibition against acts that unlawfully "coerce, intimidate, threaten, or inter-
fere with any person" in their exercise or enjoyment of fair housing rights
324
is considerably more descriptive than language from Title VII that has con-
sistently been held to prohibit post-hiring harassment. 325 Title VII's relevant
language covers discriminatory "compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment,, 326 which has allowed judges to differentiate between
No. Civ. A. H-04-1967, 2005 WL 3262550, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2005); Reule v. Sherwood
Valley I Council of Co-Owners, Inc., No. Civ. A. H-05-3197, 2005 WL 2669480, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Oct.
19,2005).
320. 368 F. Supp. 2d 862, 862-63 (N.D. I. 2005) (quoting Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). The court nevertheless went on to hold that a FHA claim had been articulated where
"invidiously motivated" harassment was "backed by the homeowners' association." Id. at 863 (quoting
Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330) (internal quotation marks omitted).
321. Sporn v. Ocean Colony Condo. Ass'n, 173 F. Supp. 2d 244, 251 (D.N.J. 2001); see also Reule
v. Sherwood Valley I Council of Co-Owners, Inc., No. Civ. A. H-05-3197, 2005 WL 2669480, at *4
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2005) (noting that "[s]ection 3617 does not impose a code of civility on neighbors").
322. See Sporn, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 251-52. In the Sporn decision, the court determined that the de-
fendant's alleged "shunning" of a physically handicapped tenant did not rise to the level of harassing
conduct prohibited under the FHA. Id. at 252; see also Reule, 2005 WL 2669480, at *4; Lawrence v.
Courtyards at Deerwood Ass'n, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1143 (S.D. Fla. 2004); Walton v. Claybridge
Homeowners Ass'n, No. l:03-CV-69-IUM-WTL, 2004 WL 192106, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Jan 22, 2004)
(holding that "unfortunate skirmishes between neighbors, tinged with discriminatory overtones or occa-
sional discriminatory comments," do not trigger FHA protection); Gourlay v. Forest Lake Estates Civic
Ass'n, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1236 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (explaining that the FHA should not become
"an all purpose cause of action for neighbors of different races, origins, faiths... to bring neighborhood
feuds into federal court when the dispute has little or no actual relation to housing discrimination"),
vacated and appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 8:02CV1955T30TGW, 2003 WL 22149660 (M.D.
Fla. Sept. 16, 2003).
323. See, e.g., Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 57
(D.D.C. 2002) (observing that "the failure of the FHA to 'define key terms such as "service" and "make
unavailable ..... makes congressional intent in § 3604 unclear (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1356 (6th Cir. 1995))); see also discussion supra Part ll.A.
324. See 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2000).
325. See supra text accompanying note 294.
326. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000).
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complaints that state a claim of post-hiring harassment and those that do
not.327 As discussed earlier, the FHA contains nearly identical language in
§ 3604, prohibiting discrimination "in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection therewith. 328 If the "terms, conditions, or privileges" language
in Title VII allows judicial line drawing,329 that language should be suffi-
cient under the FHA as well. And if it is not, § 3617 provides additional
criteria and detail for courts considering claims of housing harassment.33°
Assuming that courts possess adequate textual guidance to draw lines in
housing harassment cases, those lines still must be drawn. In that process,
courts have struggled to determine how violent, intimidating, or threatening
conduct must be to state a claim under, and then violate, the FHA. In
Walton v. Claybridge Homeowners Ass'n,33 1 the district court dealt at some
length with how properly to define the outer limit of post-acquisition claims
under § 3617. Rejecting the assertion that the FHA should apply only to
"extraordinarily violent and discriminatory" claims, the court noted that
Congress in § 3617 prohibited not just coercion, intimidation, and threats
but also "interference," suggesting that § 3617 was intended to cover "a
broad range of discriminatory conduct associated with the exercise of hous-
ing rights. 332 Although recognizing that "drawing a line" in cases involving
claims of less egregious forms of discrimination may be challenging, the
Walton court noted that judges "are not unfamiliar with difficult questions
of line drawing in discrimination cases. 33 3
On one outer extreme of harassment disputes lie "cross-burning, fire-
bombing and other similarly overt discriminatory acts designed to intimi-
date, coerce, or interfere with housing rights," which the Walton court de-
327. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998) (recognizing
that Title VII prohibits same-sex harassment post-hiring); Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 64 (1986) (noting that "[w]ithout question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate be-
cause of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex"); see also Spicer v.
Va. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 705, 709-10 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251,254 (4th
Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934,
944 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Zabkowicz v. W. Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 783 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
328. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2000).
329. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (explaining that "[a] recurring
point in [Supreme Court] opinions is that 'simple teasing,' offhand comments, and isolated incidents
(unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 'terms and conditions of
employment' (quoting Oncale, 323 U.S. at 82) (citation omitted)).
330. See supra pp. 217-19.
331. No. 1:03-CV-69-LJM-WYTL, 2004 WL 192106 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 22,2004).
332. Id. at *6; see also Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc., 18 F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1994) (observ-
ing that § 3617 "is not limited to those who used some sort of 'potent force or duress,' but extends to
other actors who are in a position directly to disrupt the exercise or enjoyment of a protected right and
exercise their powers with a discriminatory animus"); Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 97 F. Supp. 2d
602, 614 (D.N.J. 2000) (concluding that "violence or physical coercion is not a prerequisite to a claim
under section 3617"); Campbell v. City of Berwyn, 815 F. Supp. 1138, 1144 (N.D. I1. 1993) (denying
motion to dismiss § 3617 claim alleging interference with plaintiff's right to enjoy police protection).
333. Walton, 2004 WL 192106, at *7 (citing, as an example, sexual harassment cases under Title VII,
in which judges are required to determine "whether or not a plaintiff has alleged conduct that is severe or
pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment").
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termined to be clearly encompassed by the FHA. 3 At the other extreme are
"unfortunate skirmishes between neighbors, tinged with discriminatory
overtones," which are not appropriate for resolution under the FHA.335 In
the middle are the difficult cases, in which "factors such as the frequency
and severity of the conduct are relevant when determining how to assess a
case, just as they are in a sexual harassment case [under Title VII] .' 336 In
fact, courts evaluating housing harassment claims often import into their
analyses a Title VII-like judicial gloss, 337 asking "whether the [conduct is]
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiffs conditions of tenancy
and to create an abusive living environment." 338 Because this is "quintessen-
tially a question of fact,"339 resolution of housing harassment allegations on
defendants' motions for summary judgment will likely be rare if the Title
VII hostile work environment standard is used.34 °
Other courts, however, take a more narrow approach to housing har-
assment, inquiring whether the plaintiff was actually driven out of posses-
sion or, at the very least, whether the defendant attempted to do so. 341 As
previously noted, the Seventh Circuit in Halprin appeared to reluctantly
recognize that certain violent acts of post-acquisition harassment might vio-
late the express terms of the FHA: "As a purely semantic matter the statu-
tory language might be stretched far enough to reach a case of 'constructive
eviction,' which is one way to describe the present case (more precisely,
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. The Walton court then denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and ruled that the plaintiff
might be able to make out a claim under § 3617, where dog feces were placed on her door mat, trash had
been thrown in her yard, beer bottles had been left in her mailbox, and she had been threatened with
bodily injury both in person and over the phone, all with discriminatory animus. Id.
337. See, e.g., DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing hostile housing
environment harassment claim under the FHA); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088-90 (10th Cir. 1993)
(concluding that hostile housing environment claims are actionable under the FHA where the alleged
harassment unreasonably interferes with plaintiffs use and enjoyment of premises and harassment is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter conditions of the housing arrangement); Williams v. Poretsky
Mgmt., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 490, 496 n.2 (D. Md. 1996) (asking whether the alleged conduct is "suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiffs conditions of tenancy and to create an abusive living
environment"). This approach is lifted from the Title VII context, where courts recognize hostile work
environment harassment claims where the offending conduct is "so 'severe or pervasive' as to 'alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment."' Clark County
Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001) (quoting Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786
(1998)); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (explaining that Title VII
"forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the 'conditions' of the victim's employment").
338. Williams, 955 F. Supp. at 496 n.2 (D. Md. 1996).
339. Id. at 497 (quoting Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1989)).
340. See id. at 498. Another approach in this context is to ask whether the alleged activities have
improperly disrupted or intruded into the peacefulness and sanctity of the home living environment. See,
e.g., Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238, 243 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (observing in the
§ 1617 context that "peaceful enjoyment of one's home is a root concept of our society ... obviously
sufficiently pervasive to embrace the expectation that one should be able to live in racial and ethnic
harmony with one's neighbors [and therefore one should be held] accountable for intentionally intruding
upon the quietude of another's home because of that person's race, color, religion, sex, familial status or
national origin").
341. See, e.g., Whisby-Myers v. Kiekenapp, 293 F. Supp. 2d 845, 851 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Schroeder v.
De Bertolo, 879 F. Supp. 173, 178 (D.P.R. 1995); Congdon v. Strine, 854 F. Supp. 355, 359-60 (E.D. Pa.
1994).
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'attempted constructive eviction')., 342 Taking a similar approach, the trial
court in Halprin appeared to interpret § 3617 as applying to harassment
cases only where "threatening, intimidating, or extremely violent discrimi-
natory conduct [was] designed to drive an individual out of his home. 343
That position, to some degree, is supported by cases recognizing FHA
causes of action where extremely violent harassment was intended to, or did
in fact, drive persons from their housing. For example, firebombings target-
ing African-American families' homes and cars, where the attacks were
intended to intimidate the families and drive them from their neighbor-
hoods, have been found by courts to state a claim under § 3617.344 Housing
harassment cases involving less violent or extreme acts have also focused
on whether the plaintiff was constructively evicted from housing.345
For the purposes of this analysis, the important fact is not that courts use
different standards and criteria to draw lines between actionable housing
harassment claims and those that should be dismissed; instead, the impor-
tance of these divergent approaches is simply that courts are capable of
drawing such lines, and they routinely do so. For most courts, any difficulty
in distinguishing between serious harassment allegations and common
neighborhood squabbles does not dissuade them from drawing appropriate
lines and entertaining colorable claims. The FHA provides courts textual
guidance at least as detailed as-and arguably more detailed than-Title
VII, under which courts are consistently able to draw necessary lines be-
tween actionable cases and those that should be dismissed. Given the statu-
tory tools at their disposal and their inherent discretion, courts should not
fear that hearing serious post-acquisition harassment claims will require
them to open the floodgates to all neighborhood disputes.
342. See Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th
Cir. 2004). The court went on: "If you bum down someone's house you make it 'unavailable' to him,
and 'privileges of sale or rental' might conceivably be thought to include the privilege of inhabiting the
premises." Id.
343. See Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 208 F. Supp. 2d 896, 903-
04 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
344. See Stirgus v. Benoit, 720 F. Supp. 119, 123 (N.D. Ill. 1989); see also Johnson v. Smith, 810 F.
Supp. 235, 238-39 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Waheed v. Kalafut, No. 86 C 6674, 1988 WL 9092, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 2, 1988); Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
345. In Schroeder, for example, the district court allowed claims of post-acquisition harassment to go
forward where the plaintiff was "allegedly forced ... out of a portion of the physical space which she
was entitled to use" as a result of threats and intimidation. 879 F. Supp. at 178. By excluding the plaintiff
from common areas, defendants discriminated in the "provision of facilities" under the FHA. Id. In
another example, the Seventh Circuit in Krueger v. Cuomo, considered the existence of a constructive
eviction claim in a sexual harassment case under the FHA. 115 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1997). Although the
court did not engage in a detailed FHA analysis of the underlying allegations, it did highlight the ALU's
findings of constructive eviction: "Significantly, the AL found that [the defendant's] conduct had
caused [the plaintiff] to move out of her apartment .... 'Eventually the tenancy became so miserable that
she felt compelled to move out."' Id. at 491 (quoting the factual findings of the Administrative Law
Judge). In the Al's conclusion, the plaintiffs rejection of the defendant's advances "resulted in an
adverse consequence (i.e., being forced out of her apartment)." Id.
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2. Harassment as a Cause of Racially Segregated Housing
As discussed throughout this Article, courts evaluating claims of post-
acquisition harassment have analyzed the considerations that normally arise
whenever statutory interpretation is undertaken. The text and legislative
history are probed, and analogies to related law-here, Title VII-are
evaluated. Even a degree of pragmatism creeps into the analysis, as courts
consider whether they are capable of distinguishing between worthy FHA
claims and those that are simple neighborhood skirmishes undeserving of a
federal forum. However, as courts struggle to make sense of harassment
claims under the FHA, there is at least an underlying sense that without
such justifications, harassment occurring post-acquisition does not consti-
tute housing discrimination.346 What has been overlooked in these analyses,
however, is history. As briefly outlined below, segregated residential pat-
terns that were the focus of the FHA in 1968 were not created overnight
solely by exclusionary sales and rental practices. Instead, harassment, in-
timidation, threats, and violence have been powerful driving factors since at
least the 1800s in the development and maintenance of segregated housing
patterns across the United States.
The foundations of segregationist policy trace not simply to the obvious
inequalities of slavery but also to the reaction of northern society to Afri-
can-Americans in the nineteenth century. Although slavery was virtually
abolished in the North by 1830, racial tensions remained, with many resi-
dents of northern states believing that blacks were an inferior race, "incapa-
ble of being assimilated politically, socially, or physically into white soci-
ety." 348 Nevertheless, in the mid- to late-nineteenth century in many north-
ern cities,349 housing patterns reflected considerable racial intermixing.
350
The census performed in Detroit in 1860, for example, reflected that al-
though the African-American population was 1,402, blacks did not make up
a majority of residents on any street in the city.351 Twenty years later, new
census data from Detroit showed that even in the highest areas of African-
346. See Halprin, 388 F.3d at 329 (explaining that the focus of the FHA was to remedy minorities'
"exclusion" from desirable housing and that "the problem of how they were treated when they were
included... would tend not to arise until [after the FHA] was enacted and enforced").
347. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 17-21 (commemora-
tive ed. 2002).
348. Id. at 18.
349. In southern states following the Civil War, black workers employed as domestic servants often
lived next to their white employers on nearby side streets and alleys. See CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN
NEIGHBORS 6 (1955); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 163, at 17. One newspaper reporter from the
North is reported to have responded with surprise at "'the proximity and confusion, so to speak, of white
and negro houses' in both the countryside and cities of South Carolina" after the Civil War. See
WOODWARD, supra note 347, at 32. No later than 1890, however, segregation had descended on south-
em blacks. See id. at 42.
350. See JAMES A. KUSHNER, APARTHEID IN AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
CONTEMPORARY RACIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1980).




American concentration, blacks and whites continued to live next to each
other.352 While ethnic and racial neighborhoods existed during this time,
they were "[o]verlapping and integrated., 353 This pattern of general racial
integration in housing was not uncommon in northern and midwest cities in
the mid- to late-1800s.354 To the extent that blacks and other minorities oc-
cupied substandard housing in disproportionate numbers, the primary cause
appears to have been discrimination in employment rather than in hous-
ing.355 As minorities were excluded from higher-paying skilled employ-
ment, they were often forced into less desirable but affordable housing.356
To the extent that minorities were able to secure wages equal to those of
white workers, empirical evidence suggests that they were also able to se-
cure better housing alongside whites.357
After the turn of the century, southern hostility and the lure of new in-
dustrial jobs in the North spurred an enormous migration of African-
Americans to cities such as Cleveland, Detroit, Trenton, and Philadelphia.358
These new waves of migrant blacks were not always well received, as many
northern whites feared losing their jobs and damage to their culture and
communities. 359 To make matters worse, African-Americans were often
recruited to northern cities from the South to serve as strike breakers, con-
352. Id. at 69.
353. Id. at 55.
354. See DARREL E. BIGHAM, WE ASK ONLY A FAIR TRIAL: A HISTORY OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY
OF EVANSVILLE, INDIANA 26-27 (1987) (describing the racially mixed neighborhoods of Evansville in
the late 1800s); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 163, at 21 (providing indices of black-white segregation
for southern and northern cities in 1860, 1910, and 1940); WOODWARD, supra note 347, at 100-01
(explaining that residential segregation was rare until the 1910s); Henry L. Taylor, Spatial Organization
and the Residential Experience: Black Cincinnati in 1850, 10 SOC. Si. HIST. 45,46-48 (1986) (explain-
ing that residential neighborhoods around the time of the Civil War were "highly heterogeneous; differ-
ent populations lived side by side in the city, despite the important ethnic, racial, and socio-economic
cleavages that separated these groups in most other aspects of urban life").
355. See KATZMAN, supra note 351, at 70-71; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 163, at 19-20.
356. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 163, at 19-20; see also Taylor, supra note 354, at 63 (ex-
plaining that "[o]ccupation and socio-economic status functioned as the primary determinants of residen-
tial location in antebellum Cincinnati").
357. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 163, at 19-20. Beyond housing, substantial social and economic
connections existed between blacks and whites during this time. See KUSHNER, supra note 350, at 15-16;
ALLAN H. SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO: THE MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETTO 1890-1920, at 54 (1967) (ex-
plaining that the black leadership in Chicago around 1900 "had economic ties with the white community
and numbered among their associates white men of comparable social position"). In perhaps an over-
statement, one account explains that blacks and whites at this time "moved in a common social world,
spoke a common language, shared a common culture, and interacted personally on a regular basis."
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 163, at 18.
358. See ABRAMS, supra note 349, at 7, 23-24; ALLEN B. BALLARD, ONE MORE DAY'S JOURNEY:
THE STORY OF A FAMILY AND A PEOPLE 183 (1984); KUSHNER, supra note 350, at 13; STEPHEN GRANT
MEYER, AS LONG AS THEY DON'T MOVE NEXT DOOR: SEGREGATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 32 (2000) (describing that between 1901 and 1930, more than 235,000
African-Americans moved to New York City, Philadelphia's African-American population increased
two-and-a-half times to 220,000, Detroit's African-American population increased ten-fold, and more
than 200,000 African-Americans relocated to Chicago).
359. KUSHNER, supra note 350, at 15-16; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 163, at 29. Competition
for jobs as a source of racial and ethnic tension in the early twentieth century was a carryover from the
late nineteenth century. See KATZMAN, supra note 351, at 44-45 (discussing the tension between Afri-
can-Americans and Irish immigrants in Detroit for unskilled service jobs in the late 1800s).
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tributing to the hostility they faced as they moved into racially mixed, mid-
dle-class neighborhoods.360 As large numbers of blacks settled into northern
cities, they faced growing resentment and antagonism in the areas of educa-
tion, employment, and largely for the first time, housing.361 Many whites
resorted to violence and intimidation rather than live in increasingly racially
mixed neighborhoods,362 and blacks who escaped such hostility by moving
into predominantly minority areas were often too fearful to return to their
old neighborhoods.363 As the concentration of blacks in "black neighbor-
hoods" increased, fueled by escalating migration from the South, the foun-
dations of the American ghetto developed.364 When African-Americans
attempted to relieve the increasing pressure inside ghettos by moving into
adjacent white, middle-class neighborhoods, they often faced resistance and
resentment from their new, wary neighbors.365 On the mild end, hostile reac-
tions from white neighbors included harassing letters and offers to buy the
black family's property; 366 at their most vicious and destructive, the re-
sponse from the new community involved physical attacks, gunshots, cross-
burnings, and even bombings.367 In Chicago alone, between 1917 and 1921,
360. See BALLARD, supra note 358, at 184-86; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 163, at 28.
361. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 163, at 30. Assimilation difficulties for blacks, as compared to
other minority groups, were exacerbated by the fact that they were easily identifiable by their skin color.
See ABRAMS, supra note 349, at 7. The reaction of northern African-Americans to the influx of large
numbers of southem African-Americans was not always welcoming. In 1917, the head of the Armstrong
Association, a precursor to the Philadelphia Urban League, said that "both the native colored and white
people of our community have a feeling that the southern man is more criminal than the northern which
creates a very unpleasant attitude towards the newcomers." See BALLARD, supra note 358, at 187.
362. The histories of various northern cities are filled with examples of violence and intimidation
directed at blacks who moved into "white neighborhoods." See, e.g., BIGHAM, supra note 354, at 113-14
(explaining that a contributing factor to the greater concentrations of African-Americans in the early
1900s were the "outbursts of hostility to those few blacks who dared to consider moving into regions
tacitly understood as for whites only"); Lawrence B. De Graaf, The City of Black Angels: Emergence of
the Los Angeles Ghetto 1890-1930, 39 PAC. HIST. REV. 323, 336, 346 (1970) (providing examples of
attempts to harass, intimidate, and drive African-American homeowners out of predominantly white
neighborhoods in Los Angeles in the early 1900s). During congressional consideration of the FHA, the
problems faced by African-American families moving into white neighborhoods were highlighted. See
Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967, supra note 172, at 462 (statement of Sanford Kahn, Assistant Direc-
tor, Washington Office, American Civil Liberties Union) (discussing the physical and psychological
violence endured by minority group members who lead the way moving into "often-hostile 'White
areas"').
363. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 163, at 34.
364. Id. at 34.
365. See id. at 34-35. Racially restrictive covenants were also regularly employed to limit the reloca-
tion of black families into affordable, predominantly white neighborhoods adjacent to black neighbor-
hoods. See KUSHNER, supra note 350, at 17; De Graaf, supra note 362, at 336-37.
366. See MEYER, supra note 358, at 33-34 (cataloging letters of racial intimidation received by Afri-
can-Americans who moved into traditionally white neighborhoods).
367. See, e.g., KATZMAN, supra note 351, at 78-79 (describing the "mysterious[]" burning of an
African-American family's home in an Irish neighborhood in Detroit in the early 1920s, where volunteer
firemen refused to extinguish the fire); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 163, at 34-35; Meyer, supra note
358, at 33-47 (providing numerous examples from New York, Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland of cross-
bumings and physical attacks on the homes of African-Americans who had moved into neighborhoods
previously occupied exclusively or predominantly by whites); Joe R. Feagin, A House is Not a Home:
White Racism and U.S. Housing Practices, in RESIDENTIAL APARTHEID: THE AMERICAN LEGACY 17,
37-38 (Robert D. Bullard et al. eds., 1994). According to one commentator, "The racial issue was be-
coming centered around the home, the most emotional possession of the American family." See
2006] Post-Acquisition Harassment
fifty-eight black homes were bombed, averaging one every twenty-one
days.368 Most of those attacks occurred in the neighborhoods of Kenwood
and Hyde Park, which had once been predominantly white but had experi-
enced an influx of African-Americans in the preceding years, much to the
dismay of the surrounding white homeowners.369 In the 1910s and 1920s,
full-scale riots exploded in Chicago, New York, Indiana, Illinois, and Penn-
sylvania reflecting increasing racial discord over housing.370 Although such
housing-related violence may have peaked in the 1920s,37' it continued to
some degree through the ensuing decades.37 2 Even today, incidents of har-
assment, violence, and threats directed at minorities in the housing context
are not rare.373 And the dilemma of racially divided housing in the United
States has not been solved,374 particularly in cities that historically experi-
enced significant segregation.375
The damage caused 376 by these acts of harassment, intimidation, and
violence is exacerbated because they target one of the most psychologically
ABRAMS, supra note 349, at 8.
368. MEYER, supra note 358, at 34.
369. CHICAGO COMMISSION ON RACE RELATIONS, THE NEGRO IN CHICAGO: A STUDY OF RACE
RELATIONS AND A RACE RIOT 117 (1923).
370. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 163, at 30; MEYER, supra note 358, at 30-31. See generally
CHICAGO COMMISSION ON RACE RELATIONS, supra note 369.
371. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 163, at 35.
372. See ABRAMS, supra note 349, at 82-87 (detailing specific examples of housing-related violence,
intimidation, and harassment across the country directed at minorities); Robert D. Bullard & Charles
Lee, Racism and American Apartheid, in RESIDENTIAL APARTHEID, supra note 367, at 1, 10 (claiming
that "[r]acially motivated violence is increasing both numerically and geographically," citing as evidence
that between 1985 and 1986, forty-five known arson and cross-burning attempts were perpetrated against
the homes of Afican-Americans who had moved into predominantly white neighborhoods).
373. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 30 (reporting that the FBI investigated cross-burnings at four
black-owned homes in four different Detroit suburbs over the summer of 2005); Candidate Downplays
Role in Cross Burning, AUGUSTA CHRON., June 15, 2005, at B3 (describing reaction of Pratt, West
Virginia, mayoral candidate that his role in a 1999 cross-burning had been "exaggerated," when he
pleaded guilty in 2001 to a criminal conspiracy charge and admitted to building a cross and carrying it to
the home of a grandmother babysitting her biracial granddaughter); Cross-burning Case Results in
Probation, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 18, 2006, at B3 (describing conspiracy to bum five-foot cross in Arab
American family's yard); Taylor Men Indicted for Civil Rights Violations, U.S. FED. NEWS, Jan. 10,
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 1974039 (describing alleged racially motivated arson of an African-
American family's home); Two Plead Guilty in South Phila. Cross Burning, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 23,
2006, at B4 (reporting the burning of two crosses in the yard of an interracial couple); Weiss, supra note
30 (reporting data from the Southern Poverty Law Center that approximately one cross-burning per week
is reported nationwide at a home of an interracial couple or an African-American family); Rop Zone,
Cross is Burned on Arlington Lawn of Black Minister, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 25, 2004, at BI; March 14
Press Release, supra note 30 (announcing convictions of two men for a series of "racially harassing
incidents," including burning a cross near an Afican-American family's home, hanging a noose on their
doorknob, and throwing a dead raccoon in their yard).
374. Bennett, supra note 30 (reporting census data reflecting that "Detroit is among the most racially
divided metro areas in the United States," with the city more than 80% black and the surrounding sub-
urbs are 96% white); see JOHN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST 112-13 (1995) (provid-
ing indices of black-white segregation for the twenty-three metropolitan areas with the largest African-
American populations in 1980 and 1990).
375. See Nancy A. Denton, Are African Americans Still Hypersegregated?, in RESIDENTIAL
APARTHEID, supra note 367, at 49, 62.
376. The income opportunity denied due to residential segregation, alone, has been estimated at $10
billion annually. Joe T. Darden, Accessibility to Housing: Differential Residential Segregation for
Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians, and Asians, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND MINORITY HOUSING IN THE
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significant locations in society: the home. Considerable scholarship across
various disciplines, much of it after passage of the FHA, has explored the
meaning and sanctity of "home. '377 Beyond affording physical shelter, the
home provides intensely personal benefits to its inhabitants, including root-
edness, privacy, and safety. 378 Members of minority groups may attach
added significance to the concept of home. For many African-Americans,
for example, "home often represents the only reliable anchor available to
them in a hostile white-dominated world., 3 79 To the extent that members of
minority groups feel discriminated against or oppressed in their daily lives,
home is where they may retreat to receive support, comfort, and strength.38°
Harassment and violence occurring in this environment, then, is doubly
damaging, disrupting both objective safety and the subjective psychological
comfort provided by the home.38'
Seen in the proper historical context, threats, intimidation, and violence
are directly related to the problems of residential segregation. Although
decisions by white owners to deny sales or rentals to African-Americans
were obviously important components leading to segregated housing pat-
terns throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they were not the
entire story. Harassment of existing home owners and renters directly con-
tributed to the entrenched segregation problems facing Congress in 1968. In
this way, post-acquisition harassment is properly considered a form of hous-
ing discrimination and should remain remediable under the FHA.
IV. CONCLUSION
On the ladder of civil rights concerns for many Americans, fair housing
occupies a relatively low rung. Today, housing rights are almost never the
subject of marches or picketing, and politicians rarely give speeches focus-
UNITED STATES 109, 111 (Jamshid A. Momeni ed., 1986).
377. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Baros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255 (2006);
Roberta M. Feldman, Settlement-Identity: Psychological Bonds with Home Places in a Mobile Society,
22 ENV'T & BEHAV. 183 (1990); Lona Fox, The Meaning of Home: A Chimerical Concept or a Legal
Challenge?, 29 J.L. & SOC. 580 (2002); Lindemyer, supra note 29, at 351; Margaret Jane Radin, Prop-
erty and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 991-1002 (1982); Sandy G. Smith, The Essential Qualities
of a Home, 14 J. ENVTL. PSYCH. 31 (1994). Beyond the psychological significance of protecting the
"home," there are important financial considerations as well. Home ownership is a significant method of
capital accumulation, and considerable tax advantages accrue to home owners. See Mary R. Jackman &
Robert W. Jackman, Racial Inequalities in Home Ownership, in RACE, ETHNICrrY, AND MINORITY
HOUSING IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 376, at 39, 39.
378. See Barros, supra note 377, at 276-77. The home represents an embodiment of privately and
publicly valued concepts, including identity, family, protection from public life, security, continuity, and
a safe haven in which to relax and rejuvenate. See Fox, supra note 377, at 592; Lindemyer, supra note
29, at 370-71.
379. Feagin, supra note 367, at 20.
380. See id. at 20-24. It is not surprising, then, that the law often affords the home favorable treat-
ment and greater protections, both civil and criminal, than exist in other settings. See Barros, supra note
377; Lindemyer, supra note 29, at 368-69; Debora Zalesne, The Intersection of Socioeconomic Class
and Gender in Hostile Housing Environment Claims Under Title VIII: Who is the Reasonable Person?,
38 B.C. L. REv. 861, 886-88 (1997).
381. See generally Lindemyer, supra note 29, at 371.
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ing on housing. New or amended legislation on the subject at the state or
federal level is somewhat more frequent but still not frequent enough to
suggest that any significant concern about housing exists in the general
American psyche. This relative complacency, however, is out of synch with
the reality experienced by many minorities across the country, even today.
Although housing opportunities have generally increased over the years,
racial segregation persists, especially in cities with large African-American
populations. Furthermore, acts of racially motivated violence aimed at hous-
ing continue to be perpetrated.
It is against this backdrop that the Halprin litigation arises. The Seventh
Circuit's decision is most troubling because faced with an opportunity to
reinforce the federal commitment to both the letter and spirit of the FHA,
the Seventh Circuit retreated in a needlessly provocative way. Instead of
simply reinstating the Halprins' FHA claim given the existence of an un-
challenged HUD rule directly on point, the Seventh Circuit floated its re-
strictive interpretation of the FHA while nevertheless ultimately deciding
for the Halprins. Because a significant area of FHA coverage has now been
thrown into question, further unnecessary attention in this area seems cer-
tain to result. Subsequent case law already suggests that some courts will
adopt the Seventh Circuit's reasoning.
As demonstrated in this Article, a thorough analysis of the FHA under-
mines a narrow construction of the statute. The FHA's application to appro-
priate cases of post-acquisition harassment is supported by its text, its legis-
lative history, analogous legislation in the employment context, and an ap-
preciation for the role of post-acquisition harassment in the creation of the
very housing problem that was the target of the FHA in 1968. Nevertheless,
the FHA's post-acquisition scope is not limitless. Judges should evaluate
harassment claims to ensure that "quarrels between neighbors [do] not be-
come a routine basis for federal litigation. ' 382 But in doing so, courts must
continue to recognize that harassment, intimidation, and violence occurring
after the sale or rental of housing can be as violative of federal fair housing
guarantees as actual denials of housing.
382. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir.
2004).
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